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Anna Gelpern

Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of
Quasi-Sovereign Debt
abstract. This Feature considers the debts of quasi-sovereign states in light of proposals
to let them file for bankruptcy protection. States that have ceded some but not all sovereign
prerogatives to a central government face distinct challenges as debtors. It is unhelpful to analyze
these challenges mainly through the bankruptcy lens. State bankruptcy posits an institutional fix
for a problem that remains theoretically undefined and empirically contested. I suggest a way of
mapping the problem that does not work back from a solution. I highlight the implications of
sovereign immunity, immortality, concurrent authority, macroeconomic policy, and democratic
accountability for quasi-sovereign debt management. Along with default, fiscal transfers, and adhoc renegotiation, bankruptcy is one of several paths to reduce public debt overhang, but not
necessarily the best path to state rehabilitation. Bankruptcy centers on coordination failures and
contractual liabilities, when neither is especially salient in quasi-sovereign debt. It holds no
special advantage against moral hazard from fiscal federalism and sovereign immunity. Even so,
recent bankruptcy proposals have started a useful conversation joining previously disparate
scholarship about credit market institutions, sovereign debt, fiscal federalism, and local
government. The conversation should refocus on the problem of quasi-sovereign debt.
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introduction
Bankruptcy—a set of legal institutions to manage private debt distress—has
long captivated thinkers and politicians solving public debt problems.1 Adam
Smith observed in 1776 that a sovereign state, like an individual, may find it
necessary “to declare itself bankrupt,” and that “a fair, open, and avowed
bankruptcy” was more constructive and honorable than printing money “to
cover the disgrace of a real bankruptcy.”2 Yet the intellectual success of
sovereign bankruptcy has far outstripped its policy traction: there is no
bankruptcy regime for nation-states; examples of subnational bankruptcy are
rare and limited to nonsovereign localities.3 This seems puzzling, because
sovereign debt history is replete with examples of distress, default, and messy
restructuring.4
My Feature considers the puzzle in light of recent proposals to adapt
bankruptcy institutions for U.S. states5 and members of the European Union.6

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
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Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of
Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002).
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 930
(R.H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
Lili Liu & Michael Waibel, Subnational Insolvency: Cross-Country Experiences and Lessons
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4496, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400640 (surveying subnational insolvency approaches in
Albania, Brazil, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, South Africa, and the United States). Some
scholars and advocates have suggested adapting the U.S. Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy
model to nation-states. See, e.g., Kunibert Raffer, Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to
International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face, 18 WORLD DEV. 301
(1990). But see Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial
Reform, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2001) (criticizing the Chapter 9 analogy).
ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY
AND PRACTICE § 1.2 (1992); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 68-138 (2009); Liu & Waibel, supra
note 3.
E.g., Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Op-Ed., Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-20110127; David
Skeel, Give States a Way To Go Bankrupt, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2010,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-go-bankrupt_518378.html.
See, e.g., François Gianviti et al., A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution: A
Proposal (Bruegel Blueprint Series, No. 10, 2010), available at http://www.bruegel.org/
download/parent/446-a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-resolution-a-proposal/
file/928-a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-resolution-a-proposal-english; Daniel
Gros & Thomas Mayer, How To Deal with Sovereign Default in Europe: Create the European
Monetary Fund Now! (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 202, 2010), available at
http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/2912.
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These public debtors share a quality that sets them apart from the protagonists
in earlier bankruptcy debates: they remain sovereign but have ceded important
aspects of their sovereignty to a central government in the name of economic
and political integration. The fiscal troubles of “quasi-sovereign”7 states
present a distinct economic context for bankruptcy as a public debt
management tool, and a constellation of political interests potentially more
amenable to trading sovereignty for solvency.
The latest proposals were quickly abandoned, even as public debt problems
have continued to dominate the policy agenda on both sides of the Atlantic.
Their demise revives an old question: is state bankruptcy a good idea
perennially thwarted by bad politics, or a tempting analogy courting problems
it cannot solve? Although the answer is probably both, I argue that it is closer
to the latter.
In the recent crop of initiatives, even the best had it backwards. They
started with a bankruptcy solution, and extrapolated to the state debt problem.
To be sure, they have prompted a useful conversation joining previously
disparate scholarship about credit market institutions, sovereign debt, fiscal
federalism, and local government. But framing the conversation mainly in
bankruptcy terms is unhelpful for three reasons. First, starting with
bankruptcy flips the logical sequence: it posits an institutional fix for a
theoretically undefined and empirically contested problem. As a result, a debate
that should be filling gaps in public debt theory yields yet another chapter on
the uses of bankruptcy. Second, the bankruptcy label presumptively narrows
the inquiry, making creditor collective action problems and the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution play host to broader principles of fiscal policy
and democratic governance. That such broad principles arise in response to
bankruptcy concerns, not vice versa, is distortive. Third, the bankruptcy label
injects the intellectual and political conflicts of bankruptcy into the world of
public debt. “Bailout” and “cramdown” are fighting words in both worlds, but
such overlaps are misleading. Talking about state debt as “state bankruptcy”
sets the stage for replaying entrenched arguments from a different field, and
threatens to derail a useful exchange for the wrong reasons.

7.

I take the term from Justice Cardozo’s dissent in Ashton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), where the Court struck down the original U.S.
municipal bankruptcy statute. According to Justice Cardozo, “In the public law of the
United States a state is sovereign or at least a quasi-sovereign. Not so, a local governmental
unit, though the State may have invested it with governmental power.” Id. at 542 (Cardozo,
J., dissenting). “Part-sovereign” may be a more accurate, if less colorful and pedigreed,
description.
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My Feature is an effort to reframe but continue the conversation. The goal
is to refocus on the problem of quasi-sovereign debt, without losing the benefit
of the debate that started with state bankruptcy.
Over the past year, supporters have offered a wide range of rationales for
state bankruptcy. Writing about U.S. states, David Skeel asks bankruptcy to
reduce public debt overhang and moral hazard from bailouts, and to improve
fairness and process legitimacy in public finance.8 Creditor collective action
problems loom large for François Gianviti and colleagues in the EU,9 and for
Steven Schwarcz in the United States.10 For Jeb Bush and Newt Gingrich,
bankruptcy is a tool to battle interest groups (here, unionized state workers).11
Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer would use bankruptcy elements to overcome
structural asymmetries in the design of eurozone institutions.12
Diverse ways of framing the problem are at the heart of private bankruptcy
theory13 and are consistent with the history of public bankruptcy initiatives. For

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

892

David A. Skeel, Jr., State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE:
UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (David A.
Skeel, Jr. & Peter Conti-Brown eds., forthcoming 2012), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/
upenn_wps/382; David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907774.
Gianviti et al., supra note 6.
Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2011).
Bush & Gingrich, supra note 5.
Gros & Mayer, supra note 6, at 5. The eurozone comprises the subset of EU members that
have ceded the right to coin their own currencies and have adopted the euro. They are
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987), argues that corporate
bankruptcy balances competing values to distribute the consequences of default in society,
while Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816 (1987), sees corporate bankruptcy as a discrete system to
maximize value for the creditors in response to collective action problems among them.
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 907 (1982), first articulated the creditors’ bargain theory of bankruptcy as a
response to the creditor collective action problem. Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating
Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991), rejected the view of
bankruptcy as debt collection in favor of a “value-based account” of bankruptcy as group
rehabilitation from financial distress. See also Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into
Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994) (arguing that community
interests should inform personal and corporate bankruptcy systems); Thomas H. Jackson &
Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the
Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989) (expanding the creditors’ bargain model to
allow for distributional considerations).
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example, the mission of municipal bankruptcy in the United States has gone
from neutralizing holdout creditors to comprehensive rehabilitation;14
elsewhere municipal bankruptcy has served as a vehicle for negotiating
federalism;15 meanwhile, proposals for international sovereign bankruptcy have
shifted from targeting holdouts to battling bailouts and moral hazard.16
That bankruptcy can promise to solve all of the above problems—and that
theorists can debate its mission for decades—testifies to its richness and
elasticity. But there is a downside. “Bankruptcy” can become all things to all
people, a heuristic for managing debt distress in general that confuses and
disappoints when transplanted to a particular new setting. To wit, Adam
Smith’s place in sovereign bankruptcy debates: eminent advocates have
claimed him as an intellectual ancestor,17 but it is doubtful that his “avowed
bankruptcy” would have resembled the collective debt adjustment process at
the heart of modern proposals.18 Much as Smith has brought caché to diverse
sovereign bankruptcy proposals, “bankruptcy” is becoming the banner under
which good people battle all manner of public debt problems.
With bankruptcy’s public debt mission noted (at least in the alternative),
the discourse quickly shifts to implementation, constitutional logistics, and
transition costs. Which design will clear the state consent requirement in
constitutional jurisprudence? Which will win the most votes in today’s political
climate? Is bond market contagion a danger? Does it follow from enacting

14.

Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 351, 355 (2010).

15.
16.
17.

18.

See, e.g., Liu & Waibel, supra note 3, at 11.
See Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 1, at 494.
The following proposals cite the same passage from Smith, which also opened this Feature,
casting him as an eminent early advocate of bankruptcy for states: Ross P. Buckley, The
Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 43 INT’L LAW. 1189, 1190-91 (2009);
Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework To Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L.
299, 300 (2005); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Roadblock to a Sovereign Bankruptcy Law, 23 CATO J. 73,
73 (2003); see also Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 1, at 471 n.2 (tracing modern sovereign
bankruptcy proposals citing Smith).
Smith’s most-quoted state bankruptcy passage comes in the context of complaints about
“pretended payment” in devalued currency, a narrow category of debtor moral hazard.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 930. Smith does not appear concerned with the problems of
disorderly default, creditor collective action, or debtor rehabilitation, which animate today’s
bankruptcy. In Smith’s time, debtors’ prisons were the norm, and “bankruptcy” was an
involuntary collection proceeding against traders. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 10 (1995).
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bankruptcy, or from invoking it?19 All these questions become relevant only if
bankruptcy does in fact help solve the debt problems of quasi-sovereign states.
If it does, its benefits might even outweigh the costs of constitutional or treaty
change, and could certainly outweigh the political and market risks of
enactment.
Over a year into the debate, the link between quasi-sovereign debt
problems and bankruptcy solutions remains tenuous. Debt overhang requires
debt relief, not bankruptcy. Relief can come from default, fiscal transfer
(bailout), ad-hoc renegotiation, or bankruptcy. Is bankruptcy the best path?
Similarly, process problems in quasi-sovereign debt restructuring remain a
matter for speculation. The modern history of sovereign debt distress is
remarkable for its dearth of collective action problems of the sort that
traditionally motivate bankruptcy for private debt.20 Is it just a matter of time
before they appear or are properly diagnosed—and should bankruptcy be
adopted preemptively? Bankruptcy’s capacity to rehabilitate, and not just

19.

20.

894

See Skeel, State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, supra note 8, at 2-5 (addressing the leading
arguments against state bankruptcy); Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 8, at 22-38
(same).
This is not to say that sovereign debt relief has been quick and smooth. Rather, the delays
and disruptions in the run-up to recent bond restructuring cases, even egregious ones such
as Argentina’s decade-old default, are more readily attributable to economic and political
factors distinct from classic creditor collective action failures (asset grabs, courthouse races).
See Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Argentina, 12 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 465 (2006) (describing political factors behind Argentina’s delay in
addressing its debt overhang). Bond restructuring techniques appear to mitigate private
creditor coordination problems once a sovereign decides to seek debt relief. See Ran Bi,
Marcos Chamon & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Problem that Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in
Sovereign Debt Restructurings 7-8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/265, 2011),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11265.pdf (proposing a theory
to explain the relatively smooth progression of sovereign debt restructurings beginning in
the late 1990s).
In the unfolding government debt crisis in Europe, the biggest challenge has been
coordination among potential guarantors and spillover victims—member states of the
eurozone that did not start out as creditors of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, or Italy—not
private creditors, which are mostly regulated institutions unusually susceptible to
government suasion. See EUR. BANKING AUTH., 2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST AGGREGATE
REPORT 29 (2011), available at http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/pdf/EBA_ST_2011_Summary
_Report_v6.pdf (reporting bank holdings of European sovereign debt); Anna Gelpern,
Defies Credulity Eupdate, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 24, 2011, 11:25 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2011/08/defies-credulity-eupdate.html. Early theories of official sector involvement
in sovereign debt negotiations with private creditors did not focus on coordination problems
within the official sector. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for
Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining Theoretic Framework, 35 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 644, 645 (1988).

bankruptcy, backwards: the problem of quasi-sovereign debt

deleverage, municipalities and individuals is limited by law; its rehabilitation
record is underwhelming. Bankruptcy is at best unproven, and at worst
unsuited to overtly political tasks, such as mediating among political interest
groups and brokering fiscal federalism.21 For this and related reasons,
municipal bankruptcy in the United States studiously avoids the appearance of
political meddling.
Saying that bankruptcy’s utility for quasi-sovereign debt is unproven does
not foreclose its relevance, or expose it as political subterfuge. A debtor
insolvent on account of dysfunctional politics needs debt relief no less than one
that has fallen victim to bad luck or mismanagement. If bankruptcy tools can
help, they should. And if bankruptcy tools can be adapted or improved for use
in public debt, all the better: for example, the answer to bankruptcy’s poor
municipal rehabilitation record may be to expand its powers,22 not limit its
scope. The challenge is to diagnose the debt problem before evaluating the
proposed solution on its merits and in political context.
In what follows, I first map the problem of quasi-sovereign debt distress
and restructuring before considering bankruptcy in light of recent proposals. I
begin with the distinctive characteristics of quasi-sovereign debtors and their
debt problems, and end by asking how bankruptcy might help. With the rich
history of quasi-sovereign debt distress,23 I feel safe in assuming the occasional
need for debt relief among this category of debtors. This allows me to steer
clear of arguments about the current sustainability of eurozone debt and U.S.
state pension commitments, which are tangential to the case for a standing
bankruptcy law. Put differently, I assume the possibility of a debt overhang,
but not problems with the debt restructuring process, such as coordination
failure, where bankruptcy might ultimately hold a special advantage. To the
greatest extent possible, I try to generalize from U.S. and other examples. I
look for structural flaws in the quasi-sovereign debt management toolkit before
considering any bankruptcy tools that might help fix them. Whether the fix
should be called bankruptcy and get a part in the U.S. Code or the European
treaty complex is a question of implementation beyond the scope of this
project.

21.
22.

23.

Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898775.
See Clayton P. Gillette, Political Will and Fiscal Federalism in Municipal Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/269
(arguing for expanding municipal bankruptcy to authorize tax increases).
See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987); Liu & Waibel, supra note 3.
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I proceed as follows: Part I describes quasi-sovereign debtors, highlighting
the ways in which they differ from private debtors commonly eligible to file for
bankruptcy and from other public debtors, especially fully sovereign states and
nonsovereign localities. Part II begins with an overview of grounds for quasisovereign debt relief and considers gaps in the debt management toolkit. Part
III asks how bankruptcy might fill them. I conclude that bankruptcy’s likely
contributions are limited and often hinge on a set of questionable assumptions.
Redirecting the bankruptcy debate to take a fresh look at established
alternatives, such as federal funding conditional on policy reform and debt
restructuring, promises better answers to quasi-sovereign debt problems—
though hardly a cure.
i. quasi-sovereigns and their debts
Public debtors comprise fully sovereign states, states that have partly ceded
sovereignty to central governments, local and municipal authorities that are not
sovereign but derive their powers from some combination of the sovereign
above and the people below,24 and all manner of public instrumentalities,
including commercial firms established or owned by sovereigns, with limited
powers deriving from charters and authorizing laws. I focus on the second
category: states that have partly ceded sovereignty to central governments. I
use the unmodified term “states” to describe entities in either or both of the
first two categories, and “quasi-sovereigns” to refer to members of the second
category only.
As the name suggests, quasi-sovereigns occupy the middle ground between
localities and nation-states. They retain “the self-sufficient source of political
power” that was their original endowment, but have ceded certain derived
“specific political powers”25 in a constitutional compromise. The category
boundaries are hard to draw: some national laws and most treaties involve
ceding sovereignty, but do not make the parties quasi-sovereign in the sense
relevant to this discussion. For example, quasi-sovereign U.S. and eurozone
states gave up coining their own currency, yet so did fully sovereign Ecuador
(by adopting the U.S. dollar as legal tender). The distinction lies in the intent
and institutional commitment to pool sovereignty: Ecuador can enact a new

24.

25.

896

AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 4, § 2.1, at 39-40; Michael W. McConnell & Randal C.
Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 425, 427 (1993) (describing cities as alternately political subdivisions of sovereign
states and agents of private inhabitants).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
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law to recapture monetary autonomy; the others cannot without breaching
treaties or constitutions. The scope of pooling arrangements can vary. At this
writing, Europe’s union has preserved substantial fiscal autonomy for its
members but has been progressively absorbing other economic and regulatory
policy prerogatives. Compared to the European Union, the deeply integrated
U.S. federal system makes state sovereignty look vestigial, but it remains
central to the federal structure and political imagination.26 The precise content
of ceded sovereignty may be uncertain at the outset, to be elaborated and
changed over time. For instance, U.S. states found out over a century into their
union that they had given up sovereign rights to espouse the claims of their
citizens.27
Scholarly and policy treatments of subnational debt generally avoid delving
into the distinctions between sovereign and nonsovereign borrowers. Some
appear to assume that all subnational borrowers are nonsovereign; for others,
the distinction makes minimal difference to what they study; yet for others, the
causes and consequences of avoiding sovereignty are harder to discern.28 In
contrast, much of this Feature is devoted to the implications of subnational
sovereignty for debt management.
Below, I describe the distinct attributes of quasi-sovereigns as debtors. I
compare them first to private debtors, individuals, and firms usually eligible
for bankruptcy protection. Next, I compare quasi-sovereigns to fully sovereign
states, which have no recourse to bankruptcy, and to localities, which can file
for protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In the end, I
suggest that quasi-sovereigns are different from other public and private
debtors in fundamental respects. As a result, the debt problems of quasisovereigns do not map neatly either on to bankruptcy or on to established
sovereign debt restructuring procedures. I consider the implications of this
conclusion in Part II.

26.

27.

28.

Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that “what now passes for federalism in the
United States is actually managerial decentralization.” MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD
RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE, at ix (2008).
See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (dismissing suits brought by New
Hampshire and New York against Louisiana seeking debt repayment to plaintiff states’
citizens on the grounds that these suits violated the Eleventh Amendment).
See, e.g., AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 4 (focusing on nonsovereign municipal debt);
Liu & Waibel, supra note 3 (generally avoiding questions of sovereignty); John Petersen,
Financial Market Structure, Regulation, and Operations, in SUBNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 126 (Mila Freire et al. eds., 2004)
(implicitly treating all subnational debt as nonsovereign).
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A. Quasi-Sovereign and Private Debtors
That states are different from private firms and individuals is intuitive.
States have distinct forms, functions, institutional structures, and channels of
accountability, with no ready analogue to private entities. This Section does
not attempt a comprehensive (and pointless) catalogue of differences. I limit
the description to quasi-sovereigns as debtors, focusing throughout on
attributes relevant to adapting private restructuring and reorganization tools.
1. States Are Immune from Lawsuits on Their Debts and Their Assets Are
Immune from Attachment
Perhaps the most salient difference between state and private debt
obligations lies in their judicial enforceability. Debt contracts entered into by
people and firms are enforceable in court and against the debtor’s assets.
Immunity doctrines put states and their assets outside judicial purview, unless
the state agrees to be sued or an exception applies. Immunity has at least three
important implications for debt management. First, it puts the debtor’s assets
presumptively beyond creditors’ reach, altering the traditional concept of a
bankruptcy estate beyond recognition. Second, it severely limits the
enforcement sanction for debt nonpayment and creates commitment problems
that have come to define state borrowing. Third, immunity blunts or
eliminates traditional collective action problems that have come to motivate
bankruptcy.
The scope of immunity differs among sovereign and quasi-sovereign
debtors, a function of internal constitutional arrangements. For example, U.S.
states generally enjoy robust immunity from lawsuits for money damages, and
they cannot be sued for defaulting on debts without their consent in the United
States.29 This is not a necessary, nor a universal consequence of sovereignty—

29.

898

See ORTH, supra note 23, at 42-46, 123-26, 132 (discussing the evolution of the Eleventh
Amendment bar on suing U.S. states in federal courts in tandem with recurring state debt
defaults, the relationship between constitutional and common law sovereign immunity
protections, and the emergence of state consent to be sued as a way of overcoming both
constitutional and common law concerns); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limiting the
judicial power of the United States with respect to proceedings against states); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (finding Louisiana immune from suit by one of its own citizens
under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution for amending the state constitution to
stop servicing its debt). Although one court construed state immunity narrowly in
connection with Arkansas’s attempt to restructure its debt unilaterally (suggesting the
possibility of an injunction against a state treasurer), the decision remains an outlier.
Hubbell v. Leonard, 6 F. Supp. 145, 151 (E.D. Ark. 1934) (“The state is not named as a party
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other quasi-sovereigns may have agreed to be sued under federal arrangements
with no analogue to the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Under
public international and U.S. foreign relations law, foreign sovereigns
generally lose their immunity from suit when they engage in “commercial
activity,”30 defined by the U.S. Supreme Court specifically to include public
debt issuance.31 A U.S. state might be more exposed to lawsuits abroad than at
home.

30.

31.

to this suit, but, if the state is the real party in interest, and the officer is merely a nominal
party, then the suit is in substance one against the state, and cannot be maintained. . . . We
cannot, however, agree with counsel for defendant that in considering the question as to
whether this is a suit against the state, we should not give attention to the question as to
whether the legislative acts, under color of which the defendant claims the right to act, are
void as violative of the contract clause of the Constitution. If these acts are unconstitutional,
and for that reason void, they furnish no protection for the acts of the officer, and hence a
suit to enjoin such acts could not be said to be a suit against the state.” (citations omitted));
see Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can Learn from Municipal Insolvency, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE: UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (David
A. Skeel, Jr. & Peter Conti-Brown eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 19 n.56) (on file
with author) (questioning whether Hubbell was correctly decided). See generally Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186-87 (1964) (“[In Hans,] the action was a contractual one
based on state bond coupons, and the plaintiff sought to invoke the federal-question
jurisdiction by alleging an impairment of the obligation of contract. Such a suit on state debt
obligations without the State’s consent was precisely the ‘evil’ against which both the
Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity doctrine of the Hans case were directed.”
(footnote omitted)). Hans is consistent with the expansive vision of sovereign immunity
promulgated by the Supreme Court outside the public debt context in the late 1990s. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The
Court recognized an exception in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356
(2006), where it permitted a bankruptcy trustee to sue the state to avoid a preferential
transfer by the debtor to state agencies. Some of the Court’s language in Katz is quite broad,
potentially pointing to a sweeping bankruptcy exception to sovereign immunity. However,
the prevailing reading remains narrow, limited to states’ role as creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings. According to the National Bankruptcy Conference, “The [Katz] decision does
not imply that any State waived sovereign immunity with respect to itself as a debtor or that
any State, in adopting the Constitution, agreed that another State may be a debtor in a
bankruptcy case.” The Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and
the Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement
of the Nat’l Bankr. Conference).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). The Act codifies
a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, including the commercial activity exception. See
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May
19, 1952), reproduced in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, app. 2 at 711-15
(1976) (describing state practice and U.S. State Department policy with respect to the
evolving immunity doctrine); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
488 (1983) (discussing federal codification).
See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614-17 (1992).
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Even if a creditor succeeds in suing a state on a debt contract, the creditor is
unlikely to get paid because state property is separately protected from
attachment. U.S. states’ property is exempt from attachment without the
debtor’s consent,32 and foreign sovereigns theoretically exposed to attachment
rarely leave attachable property “used for a commercial activity” outside their
borders.33 By comparison, non-sovereign municipalities are not immune from
suit;34 however, they are effectively protected from enforcement against their
property in much the same way as sovereign debtors. Courts have held that
public property of municipalities cannot be attached to satisfy a debt judgment
out of concern not to interfere with municipal functions for the sake of private
creditors.35
In lieu of attachment, creditors have the state remedy of mandamus: a
court order directing a public official to raise taxes to pay debts. However,
commentators have observed that both states and municipalities have an
impressive record of avoiding mandamus, at the extreme, by having the
targeted official resign from office.36
Market practice with respect to immunity waivers appears counterintuitive
at first blush. U.S. states, which cannot be sued in U.S. courts without their
consent, do not usually waive immunity from suit or attachment.37 On the

32.

33.

34.

35.
36.

37.
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See Watters v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 295 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity to states against the imposition or
enforcement of equitable liens and related devices); see generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712-13 (1999) (holding that states, as sovereigns, have the immunity of any other
sovereign).
Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation:
Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 59 (2010) (“Not
only are judgment creditors faced with a narrow exception to immunity for the foreign
state’s property under these decisions, but also, in any event, insolvent sovereign debtors
rarely have even arguably attachable assets in jurisdictions where execution is possible.”).
See, e.g., Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1976)
(holding that a moratorium on servicing New York City notes violated the state
constitution); see also ORTH, supra note 23, at 110-20 (contrasting the treatment of states and
municipalities under immunity doctrines).
AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 4, § 5.4.3.
See, e.g., id. § 5.4.1.; ORTH, supra note 23, at 116 (describing an act of the Dakota Territory
legislature enabling county commissioners “to terminate their offices by filing resignations
with the county clerk . . . to frustrate federal writs of mandamus”).
See, e.g., STATE OF N.Y., OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS 4 (Feb. 25,
2010, as supplemented Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/debt/general
_oblig_bonds/final_2010abc_official_statement.pdf (“The State Constitution does not
provide for the contingency where an appropriation for debt service on bonds has been
made but moneys are unavailable on the payment date. . . . Judgments against the State may
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other hand, foreign sovereigns, whose consent to be sued is arguably
superfluous under U.S. and international law, routinely waive immunity when
issuing abroad.38 An informal review of publicly accessible securities disclosure
with respect to the general obligation bonds of U.S. states39 reveals that ten
states either expressly waive immunity or disclose that state law implies
consent to be sued in their own state courts.40 No U.S. state consents to be
sued in federal court. Three more states describe partial waiver of immunity.41
However, even those states that consent to be sued often simultaneously
disclose that their assets remain immune from attachment and execution,
leaving successful litigants without effective remedy.
Flowing from immunity, it makes little sense to conceive of state debt
adjustment in the traditional terms of managing a bankruptcy estate for the

38.
39.
40.

41.

not be enforced by levy and execution against property of the State, and such enforcement is
limited to the amount of moneys appropriated by the Legislature and legally available for
such purpose. Because the State has never defaulted . . . there has never been any occasion to
test a bondholder’s remedies in this circumstance.”).
LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 140-44 (2004)
(describing market practice for waiving foreign sovereign immunity).
Fifty-state survey on file with author (based on Electronic Municipal Market Access, MUN.
SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://emma.msrb.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2011)).
See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS, at 3 (Mar. 23,
2011), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP515675-EP401847-EP799131.pdf; COMMONWEALTH
OF VA., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, at 11 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://emma.msrb.org/
EP333667-EP38346-EP660371.pdf; STATE OF DEL., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, at 5 (Oct.
14, 2009), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP336423-EP38706-EP660738.pdf; STATE OF
MINN., GENERAL OBLIGATION STATE BONDS, at 7 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EA401804-EA314525-EA710222.pdf; STATE OF NEV., GENERAL
OBLIGATION (LIMITED TAX) BONDS, at I-10 (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/
EP483256-EP376652-EP773599.pdf; STATE OF N.H., GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING
BONDS, at 2 (July 14, 2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EA390897-EA307175
-EA702852.pdf; STATE OF N.J., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, at 4 (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EP367689-EP288730-EP683994.pdf; STATE OF N.Y., GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS, at 4 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP516513
-EP402775-EP800037.pdf; STATE OF N.C., GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS, at 2
(Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP458390-EP358290-EP755324.pdf;
STATE OF WASH., VARIOUS PURPOSE GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS & GENERAL OBLIGATION
BONDS, at 15 (Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://emma.msrb.org/ER450945-ER351277
-ER747565.pdf; see also Gillette, supra note 29 (manuscript at 18-22) (describing state
statutes, constitutional provisions, and jurisprudence relating to state immunity).
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, at 5 (May 19, 2010), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EP427869-EP336168-EP732480.pdf; STATE OF MICH., FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT GENERAL OBLIGATION NOTES, at 4 (Sep. 30, 2010), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EP364902-EP286561-EP681763.pdf; STATE OF TENN., GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS, at 6 (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP462971
-EP360341-EP757350.pdf.
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benefit of creditors, or even a broader range of constituents. There is no estate,
not just for purposes of liquidation, but for any purposes to do with satisfying
the collective claims against the bankrupt entity out of its assets.42 A pool of
assets might be allocated for such a purpose with state consent (for example, by
special appropriation), but the device does not derive from bankruptcy law or
technique.
Another key consequence of immunity is states’ limited ability to commit to
perform under their contracts, or even their enactments, including statutory
and constitutional repayment priorities.43 The dearth of available commitment
devices can push states to risky debt management practices.44 To reassure
creditors, nation-states have issued debt denominated in foreign currencies45 or
indexed to valuable commodities46 and have progressively shortened the
maturities of their debts.47 U.S. states have paid higher interest rates as
economic conditions have worsened and have pledged revenues to secure new
borrowing.48 Inability to commit can be expected to produce unsustainable
debt structures prone to distress and default.
Third, immunity appears to blunt certain kinds of collective action
problems that have motivated bankruptcy. Immunity acts in important
respects like an automatic stay on enforcement, a feature of the U.S. and other
bankruptcy regimes, which protects the debtor from lawsuits and protects its

42.

43.
44.

45.
46.

47.

48.
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There is an analogy to a bankruptcy estate swallowed up by statutory exemptions,
particularly common in personal bankruptcy. However, personal bankruptcy exemptions
key off the identity of the property, not of the debtor.
Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289, 289-90 (1981).
E.g., INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, LIVING WITH DEBT: HOW TO LIMIT THE RISKS OF SOVEREIGN
FINANCE (2006), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum
=1581016; Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign
Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004).
This technique responds to fears of devaluation and inflation. See INTER-AM. DEV. BANK,
supra note 44, at 245-46.
See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); see also Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold
Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 504 (1983) (arguing that indexation is unsustainable).
See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 44, at 793; Jeromin Zettelmeyer, IMF Research Dep’t, The
Case for an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt (Sept. 29, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 22 (1999).
STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT:
AN ANALYSIS 5 (2011) (citing data from Thomson Reuters as provided by the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association).
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assets from seizure.49 Creditors that might ordinarily rush to the courthouse,
or to grab the debtor’s few possessions, are precluded from doing so where
immunity is robust. Even where immunity is incomplete, states enjoy
substantial protections from their creditors compared to most debtors outside
bankruptcy.
Theories of sovereign debt offer a limited account of the interaction
between sovereign immunity and creditor collective action problems.
Economic theories emerging out of the developing country debt crisis in the
1980s50 defined sovereign debt as debt with limited enforcement capacity
owing to sovereign immunity.51 Economists also modeled ways in which
sovereign debtors and bank creditors could extract side payments from creditor
country taxpayers, who suffered spillover effects of protracted debt default, to
help close debt restructuring deals.52 By the late 1990s, the literature had
turned to focus on creditor collective action problems. This shift was motivated
by the change in sovereign debt composition. Whereas most of the distressed
debt in the 1980s took the form of syndicated loans, at the start of the 1990s,
these loans were restructured into tradable bonds,53 which became the
foundation of today’s $600 billion emerging market bond market.54 In the

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE
INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/
index.htm (offering a summary of best practices based on cross-country surveys of
corporate insolvency regimes, including the availability of enforcement stays).
See, e.g., NANCY BIRDSALL ET AL., DELIVERING ON DEBT RELIEF: FROM IMF GOLD TO A NEW
AID ARCHITECTURE 14-15 (2002); WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT REEXAMINED
72-79 tbls.2.10, 2.11, & 2.12 (1995).
Compare Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 43, 46-47 (1989) (arguing that reputation sanctions are alone insufficient to
support repayment), with Harold L. Cole, James Dow & William B. English, Default,
Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt,
36 INT’L ECON. REV. 365, 367-68 (1995) (noting debt repayment as a signal of borrower
quality to attract capital inflows), and Eaton & Gersovitz, supra note 43, at 289-90 (finding
debt repayment driven by reputational need to keep borrowing). For a comprehensive
review of economic theories of sovereign debt repayment in the legal literature, see William
W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (2004).
See, e.g., Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 20, at 644. For an overview and update, see Jeremy
Bulow, First World Governments and Third World Debt, 2002 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 229, 229-31.
See ANNE O. KRUEGER, INT’L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 6-7 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/
eng/sdrm.pdf.
BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2011 app. at 117 tbl.12D
(2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1109.pdf.
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newer literature and policy analysis, the eventual success of the 1980s
restructurings (such as it was) was attributed to debt form and creditor
identity, not debtor immunity. Unlike regulated banks, bondholders were
expected to rush to the courthouse. Simultaneously, they were expected to hold
out in debt restructuring negotiations, free riding on the concessions of others
and later litigating for full repayment. As sovereign financing shifted from
commercial bank loans to bonds—where creditors were more numerous,
diverse, dispersed, and less subject to suasion by regulators—renegotiation
appeared to present a virtually insurmountable challenge.55 In the late 1990s,
fearing chaos and contagion, officials in wealthy countries and international
financial institutions appeared to be chronically averse to bond restructuring
and prone to bailouts.56 The early 2000s policy response, partly driven by
bailout aversion, included heavy official pressure to change foreign sovereign
bond contracts to facilitate collective renegotiation,57 and a failed effort to
establish a more robust, treaty-based sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund.58 This response echoes

55.

56.

57.

58.
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See, e.g., KRUEGER, supra note 53, at 6-8. New York law’s documentation conventions for
sovereign bonds—like the bond contracts of U.S. states—required unanimous consent of the
bondholders to amend the financial terms of an obligation. The conventions consequently
appeared to give ammunition to individual creditors to hold up restructurings for side
payments or to hold out and free-ride on others’ concessions. Moreover, bondholders were
expected to rush to the courthouse to attach the scant bits of sovereign property abroad not
shielded by immunity. See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT
CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995); GRP. OF TEN, THE
RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES: A REPORT TO THE MINISTERS AND
GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPUTIES (1996), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf.
See Bi et al., supra note 20, at 5-8 (addressing the gap between pervasive expectations of
coordination failure and the relatively smooth restructuring experience since the late 1990s).
A proposal by U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury John Taylor for reforms in sovereign
bond contracting made a particularly tight link between coordination problems and
bailouts. John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of the Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A US Perspective, Speech at the Institute for International Economics
Conference: Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards (Apr. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=455.
Official pressure helped bring about a wholesale shift in sovereign bond documentation
beginning in 2003. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case
Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006).
INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
MECHANISM (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf.
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the collective action rationale for bankruptcy, including the historical evidence
of holdout behavior in municipal bonds in the 1930s.59
Experience with debt default and restructuring in the 1990s and 2000s,
mostly involving pre-2003 bonds, did not bear out the collective action
theories. Although a smattering of high profile lawsuits and holdout
settlements took place over the past two decades, on the whole, the period saw
a surprisingly smooth progression of sovereign bond restructurings, with
default periods shrinking over time.60 Even under restrictive sovereign
immunity with its commercial activity exception, precious few creditors
succeeded in disrupting restructurings or secured disproportionate recovery.
Bond exchange techniques, including exit consents and minimum participation
thresholds, brought relatively quick debt relief for a dozen or so countries.61
Although this recent history should give comfort to states, immunity
protection is limited: enforcement still bites when states consent to be sued or
when a sovereign country has commercial property outside its borders.
However, where immunities are robust (as for U.S. states borrowing at home),
debtors may find them preferable to an automatic stay in bankruptcy. Unlike a
stay, sovereign immunity cannot be lifted by a judge on statutory or equitable
grounds. Immunity also reduces the incentive for creditors to hold out for a
higher payout in a debt restructuring. Although immunity cannot bind
holdouts as bankruptcy might, the holdout has few remedies if the state refuses
to pay on the old obligation. However, to the extent a debt restructuring frees
up cash flows for payment, some creditors may hold out in hope that a state
would choose to repay for reputational or other reasons, even if it cannot be
compelled to do so.
2. States Live Forever
This is a well-rehearsed distinction with three implications for debt
management. First, states cannot be liquidated. Liquidation marks the effective
end of life for a firm, terminates the debtor’s obligations, and serves as a
valuation backstop, a benchmark for what creditors as a group would collect if

59.
60.

61.

See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 24, at 450-51 (describing the passage of the first
federal municipal bankruptcy statute in response to holdout negotiators).
See Bi et al., supra note 20, at 5-8; Ugo Panizza, Frederico Sturzenegger & Jeromin
Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE
651, 675-76 (2009) (surveying the recent empirical literature on sovereign debt and finding
reduced periods of capital market exclusion).
See Bi et al., supra note 20, at 7-8, 14-15 (examining history and developing a theoretical
model); Panizza et al., supra note 60, at 672-73.
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debt adjustment negotiations fail. Nonsovereign municipalities can be
dissolved both voluntarily and against their will. In the United States, cities
dissolve all the time outside bankruptcy; scholars have also proposed
liquidating cities as part of municipal bankruptcy reform.62 In contrast,
liquidation is not available to states, which cannot be extinguished or absorbed
into a larger sovereign entity without their consent.
Second, immortality makes it harder to assess solvency. With no prospect
of liquidation, there is no good time to value assets less liabilities.63 State debt
is almost never repaid, is usually refinanced, and may be rescheduled in
perpetuity under highly malleable growth and tax revenue projections and
assumptions about discount rates.64 States do not normally engage in general
purpose borrowing against a stock of assets—which cannot be liquidated—but
against growth prospects and revenue streams.65 In theory, it is possible to
determine the present value of all state debts and measure it against cash on
hand; in practice, state solvency tends to be measured in cash flow terms, and
the term “solvency” is often displaced by the contested concept of debt
sustainability.66

62.

63.
64.

65.

66.
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Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming April 2012), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1919768 (describing municipal dissolution law and practice);
McConnell & Picker, supra note 24, at 429-34 (arguing for dissolution and liquidation of
municipalities).
I address the distinct question of finding state assets available to satisfy liabilities infra
Subsection I.A.4.
Citibank chairman Walter Wriston famously put himself in an awkward spot when Mexico
suspended debt payments in 1982, arguing that countries cannot be insolvent, just illiquid.
Walter B. Wriston, Op-Ed., Banking Against Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1982, at A27,
available at http://hdl.handle.net/10427/57558. The rapidly evolving argument about Greek
and Italian debt sustainability under different growth and interest rate assumptions
illustrates the continuing challenge. Gisela Vagnoni & James Morrison, Italy Under Fire in
Widening Euro Debt Crisis, REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/08/02/us-eurozone-idUSTRE7712HB20110802.
But see Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1940)
(rejecting a municipal debt adjustment plan as not serving the creditors’ best interests, due
to the unencumbered assets owned by the municipality and its capacity to raise taxes). This
notion is distinct from the practice of borrowing against dedicated revenue streams and
project finance.
See Debt Sustainability Analysis, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/dsa/index.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2011); see also Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating
Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1155 (2004) (discussing state insolvency
in cash flow terms); cf. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)
(applying the requirement that a municipality be insolvent to file for protection under
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and concluding that Bridgeport was not currently
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Third, immortality creates new constituents and time consistency
problems. States that issue long-term debt can shift the debt burden to distant
generations.67 This is distinct from similar problems caused by the political
cycle, where a government may have the incentive to borrow and spend in the
present, knowing that it will not be in office when the debts come due.68
Future generations may benefit from past borrowing if the proceeds are
invested in sound capital projects (for example, public infrastructure) and
properly amortized over time; they are unlikely to benefit from ancestral
borrowing for current consumption. Whether future generations are owed
formal duties is secondary; regardless, they have an economic stake in today’s
debt management.
3. A State’s Core Constituents Are Noncontractual and Outside Its Capital
Structure
States issue debt and have contractual creditors, much like private firms.
However, contracts in general and debt contracts in particular define only a
sliver of any state’s constituents, which include present and future citizens,
residents, property owners, taxpayers, and all manner of contract counterparties.
State “management” (government) is ultimately accountable to a diffuse,
shifting set of stakeholders, whose economic interests in the public enterprise
may vary, but most of whom have no express financial or contractual claim on
the government.
In contrast, the capital structure of a private firm reflects contractual
tradeoffs of payment priority for management control. It is an important firm
governance tool, which determines the identity and incentives of firm
constituents to a significant extent. Thus corporate debt is a claim with high
distribution priority in bankruptcy and limited management control over a
solvent firm. Equity is the reverse. Preferred stock is in the middle. Incentives
to monitor, reorganize, liquidate, and gamble for resurrection follow from this

67.

68.

insolvent and could continue to pay its bills for now, though it was likely to lose this
capacity soon).
MAGUIRE, supra note 48, at 9-10 (describing “fiscal illusion” and “debt capitalization”
theories). Future corporate shareholders must opt into the firm structure, including the
legacy of past borrowing. Future citizens often have no choice.
ALBERTO ALESINA, NOURIEL ROUBINI & GERALD D. COHEN, POLITICAL CYCLES AND THE
MACROECONOMY (1997) (elaborating the relationship between the political cycle and fiscal
and monetary policies).
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hierarchy.69 This is not to say that a firm’s stakeholders are limited to its
contractual counterparties—for example, Elizabeth Warren’s famous vision
of bankruptcy policy is based on a vastly broader conception of firm
constituents.70 Yet even hers is an exercise in expanding bankruptcy’s remit
beyond the contractual core, not upending the implications of firm structure.71
For states, the link between repayment and control, or between capital
structure and governance, generally fails. The much-remarked absence of
equity holders, or residual claimants, is just one symptom of the overall
predicament.72 “Control” for quasi-sovereigns is a function of sovereignty and
citizenship, not debt and equity. Citizens exercise some control in a
representative democracy, but where the state has ceded part of its sovereignty,
its citizens may have lost a measure of control.73 Governments have very
limited capacity to cede public management to creditors in debt contracts.
Where they exist, constitutional and contractual debt repayment priorities are
conferred unilaterally by the state, without concomitant oversight prerogatives.74

69.

70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
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Changes in corporate reorganization practice that favor creditor control illustrate the way in
which contractual counterparties can adapt to the changing business context, even as they
continue to use contracts and bankruptcy rules respecting contractual priorities to maximize
their advantage. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply: Chapter 11 at Twilight,
56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003), and David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003), give influential accounts of
the change in bankruptcy practice and examine their implications.
See Warren, supra note 13.
See id.; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 61-63 (1996)
(arguing against the effective subordination of involuntary creditors, such as tort victims).
Like states, nonprofit firms have no residual claimants. They owe duties to beneficiaries
and, to a lesser extent, to creditors and donors. However, such firms are normally organized
for a limited set of purposes and have a much narrower, more stable, and more
homogeneous set of contractual beneficiaries. Nonprofit organization reflects a relationship
between financial contracts and governance, albeit one different from the relationship
underlying for-profit firms. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS (2004); Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the
Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655 (1998); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The
Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms,
23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998) (describing the contractual basis for governing nonprofit firms).
Nonprofit firm bankruptcy tracks the basic features of corporate reorganization and
liquidation. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Charities Now Seek Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/us/20bankrupt.html.
Cf. Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1057-58
(1997) (illustrating the awkward parallel between the treatment of control and contractual
counterparties in municipal and private bankruptcy). Government agency problems are
unlike those of a firm, and not nearly as susceptible to contractual solutions.
See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
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The missing link between contracts, capital structure, and governance
makes states more like individuals, whose autonomy is a paramount value.75 In
this respect, the state-individual comparison may be fruitful. On the other
hand, states have a vastly broader range of constituents than individuals by
virtue of their public functions, to which I turn next.
4. Quasi-Sovereigns Perform General Government Functions
States’ expansive, residual public mandate distinguishes them from all
private debtors, state-owned commercial enterprises, and certain specialpurpose municipal entities. States have ultimate responsibility for the welfare
of their residents and act as “insurers of last resort” against all manner of
shocks and economic downturns.76 This residual responsibility varies among
states and over time, but it has become an important feature of the modern
welfare state over the course of the 20th century. For example, U.S. states
administer essential safety net programs such as Medicaid, mostly but not
entirely funded by the federal government.77 For quasi-sovereigns, the federal
compact allocates responsibility for providing public services in normal times,
and contingent liability in the event of a shock or a downturn. This allocation is
dynamic: when its own budget is stressed, the central government may shift
responsibilities on to states; at other times, it may step in to take over local

75.

76.

77.

Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1179 (2004) (comparing sovereign and personal bankruptcy, including
the “fresh start” objective in U.S. personal bankruptcy); Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra
note 8, at 4 (arguing that personal bankruptcy is a more appropriate analogy for a U.S. state
regime than corporate bankruptcy).
DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER
253-91 (2002). Private firms may assume social safety net obligations by contract, or be
assigned responsibilities by law. They are not the default backstop.
Id. at 289-91; Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE: UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN STATES
(David A. Skeel, Jr. & Peter Conti-Brown eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4, 10, 12)
(on file with author); Damon A. Silvers, Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them—The
Origins, Consequences and Possible Solutions to the Fiscal Crisis of the States, in WHEN STATES
GO BROKE: UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN STATES
(David A. Skeel, Jr. & Peter Conti-Brown eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 5, 12) (on
file with author) (“Prior to the New Deal, what passed for countercyclical spending in the
United States was done at the state or local level. . . . [D]ivided responsibility for
countercyclical spending has been a feature of the United States’ governmental structure
since the New Deal.”).
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functions.78 However, federalism does not do away with quasi-sovereigns’
residual responsibility for the welfare of their citizens. More often than not,
this responsibility is concurrent, much like state and federal taxing authority.79
State insolvency neither cuts off the need for essential services nor
automatically displaces their provider.
5. Quasi-Sovereigns Have Distinct Sources of Revenue and Expenditure
Constraints
States collect revenues by taxing their constituents, charging fees for public
services, and operating state-owned enterprises; they may also receive
investment income.80 In addition, quasi-sovereigns in a fiscal union receive
revenues from, and remit revenues to, the central government. Where taxes
and fiscal transfers are important, these revenue streams change debtor
incentives.
It is usually safe to assume that private debtors will strive to increase
revenues; it is not safe to assume the same for states. This is because economic
growth and revenue go hand in hand for firms and individuals, but a state
needs the intervening step of taxation to turn growth into revenue. That
everyone is for growth, but not everyone is for taxes, has implications for debt
policy. Private bankruptcy delivers debt relief and, indirectly, a framework for
stakeholders to debate how (not whether) to maximize revenues. For public
debtors, the debate about revenues goes to the heart of distribution politics,
quite apart from economic growth and viability.81 Neither bankruptcy judges
nor contractual creditors have the democratic legitimacy to compel revenue

78.

79.

80.

81.
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See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2586-91 (2005);
Alice M. Rivlin, Another State Fiscal Crisis: Is There a Better Way? (Brookings Inst. Policy
Brief No. 23, 2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/
2002/12useconomics_rivlin/pb23.pdf (describing cyclical pressures on state budgets and
federal response).
Super, supra note 78, at 2586-88. Super suggests that collaboration and shared responsibility
are among the defining characteristics of fiscal federalism, in contrast to regulatory
federalism. Id.
For example, Alaska receives a significant amount of investment revenue through the Alaska
Permanent Fund. See Press Release, Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., Permanent Fund at $40
Billion, Gains 20.6 Percent in FY11 (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.apfc.org/home/
Content/home/index.cfm (click “news archive” and then select the 8/02/2011 press release)
(reporting that the Alaska Permanent Fund Corp. earned $2.1 billion on its investments in
the 2011 fiscal year).
See infra Section II.A (discussing debt overhang theory).
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measures. Maximizing revenues may even be off the table. Bankruptcy can help
structure a conversation about debt and growth; it has no power over taxes.82
Clayton Gillette has argued for letting federal courts impose tax increases
on local authorities seeking protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.83 As he himself suggests, this proposal has limited payoff for states.84 For
municipalities, federal bankruptcy is available alongside state bailouts. This
choice of remedy in debt distress distorts incentives. Most importantly,
municipalities can threaten to file for bankruptcy to extract more favorable
conditions in state bailouts. Letting courts impose tax increases in bankruptcy
reduces the appeal of bankruptcy to opportunistic debtors. This should
discourage holdup behavior, and ultimately diminish moral hazard from both
bankruptcy and bailouts.85
Arguments for giving courts the power to force tax increases either fall flat
or sound very different for quasi-sovereigns—even without regard to the
serious constitutional concerns that would arise from federal judicial
interference with the taxing prerogatives of sovereign state legislatures. Gillette
suggests (and I agree) that U.S. federal authorities cannot and should not
credibly commit never to bail out a constituent state, because the spillover
effects from state default are more likely to be systemically disruptive.86 In
contrast, few municipal failures would precipitate systemic risk; many go
unnoticed.87 Where a bailout is plausible, the parallel availability of bankruptcy
would create holdup opportunities, giving states bargaining power to weaken
federal bailout conditionality. The result contributes to moral hazard in debt

See Levitin, supra note 21, at 35-36.
83. Gillette, supra note 22.
84. Gillette, supra note 29 (manuscript at 29-30).
85. Gillette’s other arguments for tax increases in municipal bankruptcy are less relevant to
states. Where localities get poorly targeted subsidies from the blanket federal tax exemption
for their debt, letting federal bankruptcy courts have a say over local tax policy may improve
targeting and deter overborrowing. Gillette and other scholars have argued that federal
courts already have implicit powers to impose tax increases in Chapter 9 bankruptcy,
deriving from their ability to find the locality ineligible to file, or to deny approval of its debt
adjustment plan. See Gillette, supra note 22; Kordana, supra note 73; McConnell & Picker,
supra note 24. Because U.S. judges already consider local taxing capacity implicitly (as part
of solvency and best interest determinations), asking them to do so explicitly should
improve decisionmaking.
86. Gillette, supra note 29; Rodden, supra note 77 (manuscript at 10-11) (considering spillovers
and interconnectedness among grounds for bailouts). Overall, Rodden is optimistic about
the U.S. federal government’s capacity to commit not to bail out most of the time, although
recent crisis response might suggest otherwise going forward. See id. at 11-12.
87. Anderson, supra note 62; Kimhi, supra note 14.
82.
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management. Empowering bankruptcy courts to raise state taxes might be a
sensible response to moral hazard where bankruptcy exists, but it is not a
reason to introduce bankruptcy in the first place.88 Giving federal courts
jurisdiction over state taxes would raise uncomfortable questions of legitimacy
and competence. State consent to jurisdiction might allay concerns about the
legitimacy of judicial decisions to distribute state taxes and services, but not
about judicial competence to distinguish between sovereign inability and
unwillingness to pay. In sum, giving bankruptcy courts the power to intervene
in state tax matters has fewer advantages and as many, or more, disadvantages
than giving courts the same power over municipalities.
Taxes are a peculiar venue of competition among states, with no analogue
among private debtors. Where labor and capital are mobile—more likely
within a federal union than across international borders—jurisdictions will try
to attract them with lower tax rates. The theory is that lower rates support
economic activity and thereby boost revenues.89 However, where taxes are set
too low, states may not bear the full cost of a revenue shortfall in a downturn.
The more deeply integrated their economies, the more the failure of one state
threatens all of the others, and the more leverage each state has to secure a
bailout from the others—or from the federal government, in the form of fiscal
transfers.90

88.

89.

90.
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Similarly, because courts do not now supervise state debt reorganization, the argument for
letting them consider state taxes openly because they already do so quietly does not apply to
states.
Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the “Laffer Curve,” PUB. INT., Winter 1978, at 3-4. A
distinct but related view is that local governments compete by adjusting their revenueexpenditure mix to attract perfectly mobile consumers of public services; residents are
sorted into optimal communities based on the value they attach to public goods. Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Lower taxes are
not a necessary outcome of this model.
See Gillette, supra note 22; Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal
Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 360 (2005); Steven B. Webb, Fiscal Responsibility
Laws for Subnational Discipline: The Latin American Experience 2 (World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 3309, 2004), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/07/23/000090341_20040723152347/additional/
127527322_20041117151057.pdf.
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Fiscal transfers are particularly important for quasi-sovereigns.91 In theory,
each level of government must internalize its costs; in practice, “bailouts” are
structurally embedded in a fiscal union, and go both ways. Thus, David Super
observes that U.S. federal authorities have a wide range of tools at their
disposal to support constituent states, including direct transfers, federalizing
services, assigning revenue streams, and granting new revenue sources to
states.92 Because money is fungible, all of these tools can do the work of a
bailout. Some bailouts are specified ex ante, or as ongoing subsidies, while
others come ex post. Even ex post bailouts need not be unexpected; federal
intervention may well be presumed in response to spillovers from state failure.93

91.

92.
93.

Full sovereigns can receive fiscal transfers, too—in the form of foreign aid for budget
support, or emergency balance of payments assistance, which, when rolled over multiple
times, becomes indistinguishable from budget support. Some countries rely on aid for long
periods of time. When they do so, aid becomes a structural component of the sovereign’s
budget. For quasi-sovereigns in a fiscal union, transfers are embedded in the constitutional
compact. See infra Subsection I.B.2 for a discussion of embedded bailouts and the
distinction between sovereign and quasi-sovereign debtors.
Super, supra note 78, at 2560-61.
See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization, in
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 165,
176 (Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel N. Shaviro eds., 2008). Europe’s recent experience with
“no-bailout clauses” illustrates the difficulty of legislating against this structural
predicament even in the absence of a formal fiscal union. See e.g., Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 125, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J.
(c 83) 47 (“The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public
law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for
or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific
project.”). But see id. at art. 122(2) (“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences
beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under
certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned.”). See
generally Default Lines: What Would Happen if a Member of the Euro Area Could No Longer
Finance Its Debt?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/15016124
(discussing potential crisis resolutions). At the international level, multilateral financial
support of sovereign states offers a limited analogy to federal support of quasi-sovereign
constituent states. However, while federal support may be constitutionally and politically
embedded, international bailout support—to the extent it is available—is likely case-by-case,
conditional, and contingent.
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In contrast, private entities are presumptively self-sufficient, even if some
(banks and people) are subsidized and insured.94
With respect to expenditures, quasi-sovereigns face countercyclical
demands as a function of their residual social welfare mandate: at all levels of
government, claims on public services increase in a downturn, as tax and other
revenues drop.95 A private debtor’s fortunes may, but need not, move with the
business cycle; only a few industries enjoy reliably countercyclical demand
(gold, guns, and mental health services are classic examples). In the United
States, idiosyncratic institutional arrangements limit states’ capacity and
incentives to meet countercyclical demands. For example, balanced budget
requirements across U.S. states can prompt state governments to cut spending
in a downturn and, in Oregon, to cut revenues in a boom.96 Such measures
treat governments as if they were private firms; the result is to exacerbate the
effects of the economic cycle. Procyclical state laws push against federal
macroeconomic policy.97
Beyond their relationship to the business cycle, some quasi-sovereign
expenditures may be constitutionally protected. When a private firm
unilaterally defaults on, or purports to change, its pension contracts, it may be
liable on a contract or under federal pension laws. Similarly, when a U.S. state
unilaterally changes its pension contracts, it may be liable for violating
provisions of the federal and state constitutions.98 In the past, courts applied
the “gratuity approach” to state pension obligations, which allowed states to
cut pensions with impunity; more recently, courts have used different
constitutional theories to make it much harder for states to walk away when
their own pension contracts are at issue.99

94.
95.
96.

97.
98.

99.
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See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J.
951 (1992) (considering the meaning of “bailouts” for private entities).
Rodden, supra note 77 (manuscript at 11); Silvers, supra note 77 (manuscript at 7-10)
(describing countercyclical mandates coinciding with declining revenues).
See Assoc. Press, Oregon Ready To Send Rebates, Some as High as $100,000, MAIL TRIB.
(Bedford, Or.), Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20071128/NEWS07/711280329.
See Rodden, supra note 77 (manuscript at 9); Super, supra note 78, at 2559.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977);
Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pension Deficits, the Recession, and a Modern View of the
Contracts Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 2199 (2011). Cloud’s treatment of pension obligations stands
in partial contrast to market borrowing, such as bond issuance, where unilateral restructuring
or default would not normally trigger a Contracts Clause problem, as noted earlier.
Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y
617, 622-25 (2010).
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6. States Are Few, Firms Are Many
Yet another characteristic of state debtors is the small number of states
compared to private debtors. A state bankruptcy chapter in the United States
would help at most fifty debtors. A global sovereign bankruptcy regime would
help fewer than two hundred. This stands in contrast to the many millions of
private debtors and thousands of nonsovereign localities now living “in the
shadow” of a bankruptcy regime.100 Each of the sovereign debtors is “too big to
fail”; however, their small numbers make ad hoc, bespoke restructuring
feasible. Whether ad hoc intervention is also desirable depends on its merits
relative to bankruptcy.
***
In sum, quasi-sovereign states as debtors are quite unlike private firms and
individuals. They have a robust shield from creditors in the form of sovereign
immunity, a perpetual lifespan, a broad spectrum of irreducible public
functions and stakeholders, and a peculiar mix of highly cyclical, constitutionally
constrained, and politically fraught revenues and expenditures. Adapting private
debt restructuring techniques for such debtors would require very different
assumptions about the incentives of all the actors involved, as I elaborate
further in Part III. Before proceeding to consider debt restructuring, I will
briefly compare quasi-sovereigns with other kinds of public debtors.
B. Quasi-Sovereign and Other Public Debtors
The preceding Section described fundamental differences between quasisovereigns and private debtors. Quasi-sovereigns are also different from
indebted nation-states and localities. Differences between quasi-sovereign and
fully sovereign debtors are of degree. They stem from a combination of legal
arrangements and economic realities, such as constitutions formally ceding
sovereignty, economic and political integration among members of a federation,
and the spillover effects of distress in one jurisdiction for the others and for the
federation as a whole. On the other hand, differences between quasi-sovereigns
and nonsovereign localities come back to sovereignty: one has original authority,
autonomy, and immunity, and the other does not.

100.

See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 8, at 9-10 (observing that the effect of bankruptcy law is not
limited to actual filers, because the mere possibility of filing changes the incentives for all
potential debtors and creditors).
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Some of the key differences between quasi-sovereign and other public
entities have appeared earlier in the Feature as asides in my comparison of
quasi-sovereigns and private debtors. What follows is a catalogue and
elaboration of these points, along with several new ones.
1. Quasi-Sovereigns Have Countercyclical Responsibilities but Limited Scope
for Macroeconomic Policy
Quasi-sovereign states are in an odd position: on the one hand, they are
responsible for cushioning the effects of the economic cycle through spending
on welfare, health, and public safety; on the other hand, they have ceded
important macroeconomic policy prerogatives to the central government. Fiscal
federalism can dampen cyclical pressures with transfers (bailouts) or amplify
them with unfunded service mandates to constituent states.101 Similarly, as
noted earlier, quasi-sovereign states may reinforce or push against federal
macroeconomic management in response to internal political pressures (for
example, cutting taxes in a boom). Each state’s bargaining position vis-à-vis
the central government is a function of its unique resource endowment and
other structural and political factors.102
The difference between sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns is even starker in
monetary policy. Quasi-sovereigns normally do not print their own money.103

101.
102.

103.
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See, e.g., Super, supra note 78; Rivlin, supra note 78.
See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837 (2010)
(arguing that distribution of authority between local and central government is more likely
to follow than precede economic endowment and development).
By “money” here I mean a medium of exchange that serves as mandatory legal tender
throughout the federal entity. This is distinct from “scrip,” or quasi-money, occasionally
issued and honored by subsovereign and private entities. See generally INT’L MONETARY
FUND, ARGENTINA: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2002 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION 34 (IMF
Country Report No. 03/226, July 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2003/cr03226.pdf (describing the issuance of quasi-money by Argentine provinces
during financial crisis); Stephanie Simon, Cash-Strapped California’s IOUs: Just the Latest Sub for
Dollars, WALL ST. J., Jul. 25, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124846739587579877.html
(describing Depression-era and modern-day scrip issuance by public and private entities);
Loren Gatch, Local Scrip in the USA During the 1930s: Lessons for Today? (Sept. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2.socioeco.org/bdf/_docs/local_scrip_in
_the_usa-gatch.pdf (describing scrip issuance by states, localities, and firms); Bruce
Champ, Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Stamp Scrip: Money People Paid To Use, ECON.
COMMENT. (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/commentary/
2008/0408.pdf (describing municipalities and firms issuing scrip during the Great
Depression). Ceding monetary sovereignty as part of a federal arrangement is also distinct
from the voluntary adoption by fully sovereign states of another sovereign’s currency. For
example, a number of smaller economies have adopted the U.S. dollar or the euro as their
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In some federal arrangements, including one that has obtained for over a
century in the United States, central monopoly over money is an essential
attribute of the union, a vehicle for deeper economic integration, and an
important policy tool. Giving up monetary policy autonomy means, among
other things, that a state cannot increase the money supply to stimulate its
economy and cannot print money to pay off its debts. The result is a hard
budget constraint, as in a country that can only borrow in foreign currency.104
Currency unions are a twist on the idea of monetary sovereignty. For
example, members of the eurozone have a domestic currency (the euro) over
which they have little control because of the narrow price stability mandate and
institutional design of the region’s central bank.
2. “Bailouts” of Quasi-Sovereigns Are Embedded in Fiscal Federalism
Quasi-sovereign and central authorities operate concurrently and can
substitute for one another in many areas; the precise allocation of work
between them varies across federal arrangements.105 The relationship also
varies over time: economic or political change can prompt repeated
renegotiation over resources and responsibilities.106 The process and outcome
of such negotiations are not always transparent. This view of fiscal federalism
as a dynamic negotiation at the extreme implies that the precise boundaries of
the quasi-sovereign economy are uncertain. In contrast, fully sovereign states
are more plausibly like stand-alone enterprises: it is possible to consider their
“consolidated” economies in static isolation for long enough to determine the
need for debt adjustment and the prospects for rehabilitation.
Except where the boundary between the sovereign and quasi-sovereign fisc
appears to be firmly fixed, bailouts—extraordinary fiscal transfers—are
structurally embedded in the federal system. Such transfers may be overt or
covert. Especially when they are covert, one would expect more moral hazard
among quasi-sovereigns than other debtors. Theory holds that subnational

104.

105.
106.

currency. Such sovereigns can unilaterally recapture monetary sovereignty without violating
treaties or constitutions.
While instilling discipline in distress, this attribute also takes away a sanction in default: for
example, Jeffrey Sachs’s classic theory of sovereign debt cites currency runs as a major
consequence of sovereign default. See Jeffrey Sachs, The Debt Overhang of Developing
Countries, in DEBT, STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 80 (Guillermo Calvo et al. eds., 1989).
But cf. Panizza et al., supra note 60 (discussing domestic disciplining mechanisms on
sovereign default).
See Super, supra note 78.
Id.; see Liu & Waibel, supra note 3, at 18-19; Webb, supra note 90.
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entities know they are “too big to fail” and expect to be bailed out through
readily available, but nontransparent, channels.107 As a result, they overborrow
and refuse to adjust (for example, by raising taxes).108
One way to counter such incentives is with firm commitments against fiscal
transfers, such as Europe’s infamous “no-bailout” clause.109 Such blunt
commitment devices are tested in crisis. At this writing, EU treaties have been
creatively interpreted to permit bilateral and regional bailout facilities for
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.
Expectations of a bailout also make it easier for quasi-sovereigns to engage
in tax competition: the consequences of a revenue shortfall would spill over to
the rest of the union, increasing the prospects of a bailout. For their part,
private creditors may not discipline subnational debtors where they believe
they are lending against central government credit.110 Tools to counter moral
hazard, such as legal debt limits at the quasi-sovereign and local levels, run up
against sovereign commitment problems. They are routinely evaded and
ignored, and have a terrible record of advancing their stated goal of fiscal
probity.111
Spillover effects and contagion are also used to justify extraordinary
transfers, or bailouts, at the international level. Yet the background
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See Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937,
976-77 (2008); see also Gillette, supra note 22, at 51-52; John Petersen & Mila Freire, Political,
Legal, and Financial Framework, in SUBNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 28, at 21 (describing moral hazard from central government
bailouts); Rodden, supra note 77 (manuscript at 1-2); Webb, supra note 90, at 3 (describing
agency problems in the subnational-central government relationship, bailout expectations,
and the trading of political and fiscal favors between the two levels of government).
See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 13
(1998) (contending that the origin of Orange County’s 1994 default was the passage of
Proposition 13 in 1978, which placed strict limitations on property tax increases and
effectively crippled local government’s ability to increase revenue).
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 93, art. 125, ¶ 1.
Gillette, supra note 22 (manuscript at 41).
AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 4, § 4 (describing state and municipal evasion of debt
limits, among other ways, by redefining capped “debt”); Richard Briffault, Foreword: The
Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907
(2003) (describing evasion and restrictive interpretation of state fiscal limits, and arguing
that they are ineffective); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860,
868-71 (2012) (describing state fiscal limits as ineffective and undesirable); Mark Tran,
What Is the Stability and Growth Pact?, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 27, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/27/qanda.business (describing German and
French breaches of the fiscal discipline provisions in the treaty framework establishing the
Euro); Webb, supra note 90, at 16-17 (concluding that statutory debt limits have been
ineffective at disciplining subnational borrowing in Latin America).
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presumption among governments and market participants alike is reversed
where sovereignty is not concurrent, and where economic integration is
limited. Procedural barriers to bailouts for full sovereigns are high: the
International Monetary Fund cannot quietly pick up Greece’s welfare bill any
more than the United States can secretly stick Canada with the cost of road
construction in Ohio. With economic and financial integration, the outcomes
may converge—bailouts for all. However, it is important to recognize that
private firms, sovereigns, and quasi-sovereigns arrive at bailouts from very
different places.112
3. Quasi-Sovereigns Have Distinct Immunities
While amply covered in the preceding Section, this point bears emphasis.
Foreign sovereign immunities are grounded in public international law, and
are codified in national statutes such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in the United States, the State Immunity Act in the United Kingdom, and
others like them.113 Quasi-sovereigns’ immunities are a function of domestic
law. In the United States, they are grounded in state common law, the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and background jurisprudential
rules,114 which together grant more robust protections to U.S. states than they
or the U.S. government enjoy as borrowers in the international capital markets.
Quasi-sovereigns in different federal arrangements may be in a weaker position
at home, which would make bankruptcy protections more valuable to them.
4. Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign States Face Different Sanctions for Debt
Nonpayment
Recent empirical research on the debt of fully sovereign states has cast
doubt on the role of creditor collective action problems in sovereign debt
restructuring and on the effect of traditional enforcement and reputational
sanctions in compelling debt repayment by immune states.115 As noted earlier,
bond restructurings since the 1990s have proceeded relatively smoothly;
holdout litigation was minimal; and most restructurings did not cut sovereigns

112.
113.
114.
115.

See discussion supra note 98 and accompanying text for the discussion of bailouts for private
firms compared to quasi-sovereigns.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006); State Immunity Act,
1978, c. 33 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/33.
ORTH, supra note 23.
See Panizza et al., supra note 60; discussion supra Subsection I.A.1.
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off from the capital markets for a significant amount of time.116 Nevertheless,
most countries continued paying their debts over the past two decades. In a
survey of empirical studies, Ugo Panizza and colleagues suggest that
governments may have been motivated by fear of domestic disruptions from
sovereign default: bank runs, capital markets contagion, domestic effects of
collapsing currencies, failure of important domestic constituents, and broader
social unrest.117 One implication from the survey is that home bias in the
financial system might soften the sovereign budget constraint in distress, but
can also be a source of discipline against default.
Domestic sanctions can be diffuse for quasi-sovereigns. They would bite
where, for example, financial institutions within the defaulting state have
concentrated holdings of its debt, where market contagion disproportionately
affects issuers within the state, or where the creditors most directly affected by
default also are important constituents of the defaulting government. Put
differently, a quasi-sovereign that can regulate or strong-arm local residents
into holding its debt might be able to postpone default, but would face a
stronger local backlash from it. The disruption and political backlash would be
attenuated where local bank and pension fund investments are geographically
diversified.
The difference between Europe and the United States in this area is
instructive. There is no evidence that banks and pension funds in U.S. states
hold dangerous levels of their state government securities.118 One might even
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See R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay & Guido Sandleris, Sovereign Borrowing by Developing
Countries: What Determines Market Access?, 83 J. INT’L ECON. 243 (2011) (failing to detect
significant punishment of defaulting countries by the capital markets). But see Juan J. Cruces
& Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts (CESifo Grp., Working
Paper No. 3604, 2011), available at http://www.ifo.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1210242.PDF
(arguing that deep sovereign debt reduction is associated with prolonged market exclusion).
Panizza et al., supra note 60.
Over 70% of all state and local debt in the United States is held by individuals and mutual
funds. See Frequently Asked Questions About Municipal Bonds, INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE (Mar. 2008), http://www.ici.org/policy/markets/domestic/faqs_muni_bond.
State and local debt stands at less than 1% of all capital for federally chartered banks, and a
little over 2% for state-chartered banks. See Statistics on Depository Institutions, FDIC
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (last visited Dec. 9, 2011) (search for “All Commercial
Banks” and “All Savings Institutions” within “Standard Peer Groups” and then generate
“Securities” reports in “Percent of Assets” terms); Michael Corkery, In Muni-Bond
Ills, Danger and Hope, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703960804576119870629891478.html (describing bank holdings of
municipal debt). In contrast, Greek bank holdings of sovereign debt from the eurozone
periphery are roughly double their capital. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Patrick Slovik, A
Market Perspective on the European Sovereign Debt and Banking Crisis, 2010 OECD JOURNAL:
FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 1, 16 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/
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expect a bias away from home-state debt, whose chief attraction is its taxexempt status, among entities such as U.S. pension funds that benefit from
their own tax exemptions. In contrast, eurozone banks show strong bias in
favor of home state debt: for example, according to recent examinations by
European bank regulators, Greek, Irish, and Portuguese banks were heavily
invested in Greek, Irish, and Portuguese government securities, respectively.119
As a result, the threat of banking sector collapse provides a powerful incentive
against sovereign default for Greece, but not Illinois.
5. Quasi-Sovereigns Issue Debt of Varied Repayment Priority
All the debt of fully sovereign states generally ranks pari passu; formal
sovereign priority structures tend to be extremely flat. Causes may include
immune sovereigns’ inability to commit, their legal and political inability to
trade off repayment priority for enhanced governance, as well as some
combination of inertia and network effects in sovereign debt contracts.120
However, commentators have pointed out that this apparent flatness is
misleading: creditors unable to secure credible commitment of priority
repayment raise interest rates and shrink maturities.121
Against this background, it is puzzling that some U.S. states appear to have
constitutional, statutory, administrative, and contractual priority systems for
distributing revenues among various claimants. At least six states report
apparent hierarchies of repayment priority in their general obligation
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9/46970598.pdf. Bank holdings of quasi-sovereign debt vary across countries and federal
arrangements. For example, Brazil is more like Europe than the United States: major
Brazilian banks were the leading creditors of Brazilian states, and state default would have
damaged the banking system. See Rodden, supra note 76, at 8, 13 (describing the risk of
Brazilian state debt to Brazil’s banking system, comparing Europe, and contrasting the
United States, where banks are minor creditors).
EUR. BANKING AUTH., supra note 20, at 28-29, available at http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/
pdf/EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Report_v6.pdf (reporting that the Greek banks hold 67% of
Greek sovereign debt considered in the stress test, with the Irish and Portuguese ratios at
61% and 63%, respectively).
See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 911-17 (2004); Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu
Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633439.
See, e.g., EDUARDO BORENZSTEIN ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 237,
SOVEREIGN DEBT STRUCTURE FOR CRISIS PREVENTION 9 (2004); NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD
SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
305-06 (2004); Bolton & Skeel, supra note 44, at 770-72; Zettelmeyer, supra note 47.
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disclosure documents;122 priorities range from public education in California,
to water bonds in New Jersey, to revenue anticipation notes in New York.123
Some states, such as California, accord superior legal status to priority
obligations; others, like Massachusetts, disclose repayment procedures that
accord de facto priority.124 Like all sovereign undertakings, such quasisovereign promises to follow pre-specified payment priorities might be hard to
enforce. I know of no studies of state compliance with priority undertakings;
however, there have been no reports of U.S. states violating the promised order
of repayment.
Quasi-sovereigns are also unlike full sovereigns for using dedicated revenue
streams and collateral to secure debt repayment. Secured sovereign debt is
negligible to nonexistent at the national level. In contrast, two-thirds of all
U.S. state and local government debt issued between 1996 and 2010 was
backed by specific revenues, a practice motivated in important part by internal
constitutional and legislative restrictions on debt accumulation.125 The
implications of secured public debt are mixed and depend on the terms. On the
one hand, a commercial asset or revenue stream pledged to a subset of creditors
may be unavailable for urgent public expenditures; some assets also have
political salience. (Natural resources and historical relics are often cited as
examples of inalienable patrimony.) On the other hand, revenue bonds can
offer a form of limited liability and even countercyclical debt management,
where recourse is limited to the revenue stream from an investment project,
with no separable claim on the state treasury.
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See supra note 39 and accompanying text (informal fifty-state survey on file with author).
Arkansas, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin disclose
mandatory or expected payment hierarchies among state liabilities in connection with their
general obligation bond issues. See STATE OF ARK., FEDERAL HIGHWAY GRANT ANTICIPATION
AND TAX REVENUE REFUNDING BONDS (GENERAL OBLIGATION), SERIES 2010, at 42-45 (June 1,
2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP440411-EP344657-EP741177.pdf (detailing
hierarchy of priority payments out of Revenue Fund); STATE OF CALIF., GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS app. A at A-26 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://emma.msrb.org/
EP478437-EP372944-EP769866.pdf (enumerating the order of priority payments provided
under the State Constitution); COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 40, at A-9 (describing
order of repayment); STATE OF N.J., supra note 40, at 3-4; STATE OF N.Y., supra note 40, at 4
(referencing provisions in state law controlling disbursement and payment); STATE OF WIS.,
GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF 2011, SERIES A, at 2 (Jan. 12, 2011), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EP490254-ER348940-ER745185.pdf (disclosing that an appropriation
to pay general obligation bonds was made as a “first charge” on state revenues).
STATE OF CALIF., supra note 122, at A-26; STATE OF N.J., supra note 40, at 3-4; STATE OF N.Y.,
supra note 40, at 4-5.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 122, at A-9.
AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 4, at § 1.2.4; MAGUIRE, supra note 48, at 5.
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The differences between full and quasi-sovereigns in this regard appear to
be contingent, a matter of market practice. Both enjoy robust immunities, and
nothing in theory prevents fully sovereign states from pledging collateral or
adopting priority schemes on the model of U.S. states. In practice, pari passu
and negative pledge undertakings in existing debt contracts could make a
switch difficult for full sovereigns. Moreover, quasi-sovereign priority
commitments may be more credible thanks to the expressly political and local
content of particular priority schemes (for example, valuing education in
California, and clean water in New Jersey). This may be difficult to replicate at
the sovereign level.
6. Quasi-Sovereigns Are Sovereign; Localities Are Not
Differences between quasi-sovereign debtors and nonsovereign counties,
districts, and municipalities generally come back to the constituent attributes of
sovereignty, especially autonomy and immunity. Perhaps most importantly,
nonsovereign localities have limited immunities.126 For example, U.S. courts
have held that Eleventh Amendment protections do not extend to
municipalities, which may be sued in federal courts; historically, federal
authorities have been more open to enforcing judgments against municipal
officials.127 Quasi-sovereign advantage here is partial, because national and
state laws can shield nonsovereign governments despite their lack of
sovereignty. For example, even though nonsovereign municipalities in the
United States may be sued, their public property generally remains protected
from attachment.128 Immunity is presumptive for quasi-sovereigns; for
nonsovereigns, its effects must be simulated with other protections. To the
extent quasi-sovereigns have stronger immunities, they are more insulated
from collective action problems that might interfere with nonsovereign debt
management. Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in the United States came about
partly in response to creditor holdout behavior that blocked municipal debt
adjustment, as well as a spate of lawsuits against municipal officials during the
Great Depression.129
Localities’ authority is not concurrent with, but subject to, state sovereign
power. Localities need state permission to file for federal bankruptcy

126.
127.
128.
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ORTH, supra note 23, at 110-20.
Id. at 118.
McConnell & Picker, supra note 24, at 430-32.
Id. at 449-50.
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protection.130 Sovereign authority over localities, even where it is exercised to
support and protect them, gives quasi-sovereign states tremendous policy
leverage in distress: they can demand reform in exchange for protection,
threaten dissolution, or simply leave the locality at the mercy of its creditors.
Localities’ bargaining power comes from the risk and magnitude of spillover
effects of local failure for the rest of the state.
As noted earlier, quasi-sovereign states are “indestructible.”131
Nonsovereigns can be dissolved or liquidated without their consent.132 While
liquidation may be extreme, the practice of stripping municipalities of
substantially all policy authority is widespread in the form of control and
oversight boards.133
These differences are important, but they should not be overblown. At least
in the United States, nonsovereign localities are still treated as political entities,
whose public character entitles them to judicial deference. Chapter 9 prevents
federal judges from interfering with political decisionmaking and steers clear of
the revenue aspects of municipal management.134
***
In sum, quasi-sovereigns resemble other public debtors more than they
resemble private firms and individuals. However, the similarities are
incomplete. Fiscal federalism limits the scope for economic policy at the quasisovereign level. The risk of moral hazard for quasi-sovereign debtors may be
higher, owing to robust immunities and capacity to extract bailouts in an
integrated union. Sovereignty and fiscal federalism thus import a distinct set of
debtor incentives. In contrast, municipalities face a higher risk of lawsuits and
creditor collective action problems; they are subject to more robust sanctions in
the form of sovereign oversight and potential loss of autonomy and therefore,
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United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938) (upholding a revised municipal bankruptcy
statute including the requirement of state consent to municipal filing).
Id. at 53; see supra Subsection I.A.2.
McConnell & Picker, supra note 24, at 483. See generally Anderson, supra note 62 (describing
dissolution practices).
See, e.g., Thomas W. Waldron, House Approves Oversight Board for Bankrupt D.C., BALT.
SUN, Apr. 4, 1995, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-04-04/news/1995094073_1
_oversight-board-oversight-panel-mayor-and-city; New York City Fiscal Oversight, OFF. ST.
COMPTROLLER, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/osdc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
Gillette, supra note 22 (manuscript at 11-12).
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at least in theory, should have less trouble committing to repay.135 The
distinctions between sovereign and nonsovereign debtors are particularly
consequential for considering bankruptcy.
ii. quasi-sovereign debt: distress, relief, and
restructuring
People, firms, and states alike borrow for two broad reasons: current
consumption and investment. They may also borrow to refinance maturing
obligations, without net new consumption or investment. Borrowing can
smooth fluctuations in consumption and spread the cost (and tax burden) of
productive investment over time. Like people and firms, states may run out of
funds to service their debt obligations because their revenues fall, their
expenses rise, their investments fail, or they cannot refinance their debts in the
markets. As with theories of private debt, theories of sovereign debt distress
begin with debt overhang—a condition where the debtor has too much debt
and cannot engage in productive investment. However, theoretical grounds for
sovereign debt relief go beyond debt overhang to include concerns about
autonomy and legitimacy. These evoke ideas about fresh start in personal
bankruptcy,136 and equitable sanctions in bankruptcy, corporate, and debtorcreditor law.137
My task in Part II is to identify grounds for and obstacles to quasisovereign debt relief. Although quasi-sovereigns may evoke some of the same

In the past, this view translated into market risk premiums: “In 1889, Wall Streeters ranked
municipal bonds second only to federal securities. Because cities and counties could be
compelled to pay up if necessary, they enjoyed a high credit rating.” ORTH, supra note 23, at
118 (citation omitted).
136. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1393, 1393 (1985) (“The principal advantage bankruptcy offers an individual lies in the
benefits associated with discharge. Unless he has violated some norm of behavior specified
in the bankruptcy laws, an individual who resorts to bankruptcy can obtain a discharge from
most of his existing debts in exchange for surrendering either his existing nonexempt assets
or, more recently, a portion of his future earnings. Discharge not only releases the debtor
from past financial obligations, but also protects him from some of the adverse
consequences that might otherwise result from his release. For these reasons, discharge is
viewed as granting the debtor a financial ‘fresh start.’” (footnotes omitted)).
137. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006) (giving bankruptcy courts discretion to subordinate a
claim, used as a sanction for creditor misbehavior); Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati &
Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1240-51 (2007)
(drawing analogies to fraud and corporate misconduct problems); David Gray Carlson, The
Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
157 (2003) (discussing equitable subordination of creditors outside bankruptcy).
135.
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broad rationales for debt adjustment as firms and people, they face distinct
challenges in achieving relief.
A. Public Debt Overhang (Efficiency)
Leading theories of sovereign debt distress start with Paul Krugman’s and
Jeffrey Sachs’s adaptations of the debt overhang theory to sovereigns, arguing
that an overindebted government will not be able to attract voluntary new
lending for productive investment owing to the confiscatory tax burden
required to pay off the debt.138 In particular, Krugman’s model focuses on
creditor choices; when he proposed it, private creditors were repeatedly
refinancing their loans to Latin American governments suffering from debt
overhang. Refinancing preserved an option value for the creditors, on the
slight chance the debtor could grow out of its debt burden without debt
reduction. The theory hinges on the insight that preserving this option value
comes at a cost of distorting the public debtors’ incentives, since any benefits of
economic reorganization (or adjustment) would go to the creditors.
Showing that there exists a theoretical point of overindebtedness is
different from finding that point. With most sovereign assets inaccessible to
creditors, as a practical matter, claims against sovereigns are paid as they come
due from the debtor’s primary budget surplus. When the surplus is not
enough, the debtor may be illiquid or insolvent; regardless, the next creditor in
line does not get paid. Taxing and borrowing capacity—reflecting politics and
market liquidity—obviously affect the threshold; with quasi-sovereign states,
fiscal transfers play a prominent role.139 As a result, quasi-sovereign debt
management collapses two important distinctions: between inability and
unwillingness to pay, and between illiquidity and insolvency.140 Debt
sustainability methodology attempts to recast the question of sovereign
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Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253 (1988); Sachs,
supra note 103, at 80.
See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (holding that a
municipality’s ability to pay debts as they become due thanks to fiscal transfers prevents a
claim of insolvency until funds run dry).
Cf. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM
A DECADE OF CRISES 31-47 (2006) (summarizing the literature on inability and unwillingness
to pay and emphasizing the thin distinction between the two for sovereigns).
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insolvency as a predicate for debt reduction.141 It is notoriously flawed and
fiercely contested;142 it is also the only game in town.
With no liquidation backstop, no agreed solvency threshold, no higher
authority to mandate debt restructuring, and no clear line between inability
and unwillingness to pay, the timing of sovereign debt relief is usually fiercely
contested. In most cases, the debt restructuring option is invoked too late in
hindsight—a problem that sovereign bankruptcy proposals have sought to
solve.143 One pragmatic fix is to condition outside funding to a cash-strapped
sovereign on debt restructuring. At this writing, this has been the position of
the European Union with respect to Greece since July 2011.144 The solvency
threshold and timing problem can be overcome for quasi-sovereigns by
withholding fiscal transfers, which would go to repay debt that should be
restructured. The prospect of spillovers from default, discussed at length in
Part I, detracts from the utility of this tool for sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns
alike.
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See, e.g., Debt Sustainability Analysis, supra note 85.
See e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, A DECADE OF DEBT 21 (2011)
(arguing that a debt stock of over 90% of a country’s annual gross domestic product
undermines growth, even for wealthy countries); Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,
JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN, http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Heavily%20Indebted
%20Poor%20Countries%20initiative+97.twl (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (criticizing the
World Bank’s and the IMF’s sustainability metric for poor countries, set at one and a half
times the country’s annual exports).
E.g., Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, International
Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address
at National Economists’ Club Annual Members’ Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm (“[C]ountries facing severe
liquidity problems often go to extraordinary lengths to avoid restructuring their debts to
foreign and domestic private creditors. Even an orderly restructuring can impose severe
economic costs and devastate the domestic financial system; a disorderly restructuring can
block a country’s access to private capital for years to come, making an already bad situation
even worse.”); see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 4 (2002), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf; ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf; Hagan, supra note 17, at 362 (“[T]he problem to
date has been the fact the restructurings are too late rather than too early.”); Anne Krueger,
First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and
Dispute Resolution, Address at the Bretton Woods Committee Annual Meeting (June 6,
2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/060602.htm.
Jan Strupczewski & Harry Papachristou, Greek Haircut Under Review, No New Euro Zone Aid
Until November, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/
03/us-eurozone-idUSTRE79211720111003.
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B. Jubilee and Odious Debt (Autonomy and Legitimacy)
The need for debt reduction in Krugman’s and Sachs’s models comes from
inefficiency. Moral and political justifications for government debt relief may
point to failings apart from inefficiency, such as the inability to provide for
basic human needs or the illegitimate provenance of the debt.
A civil society movement advocating debt relief for the poorest countries in
the late 1990s invoked the biblical concept of Jubilee.145 The accompanying
papal proclamation advanced a distinct set of grounds for relief:
The human race is facing forms of slavery which are new and more
subtle than those of the past; and for too many people freedom remains
a word without meaning. Some nations, especially the poorer ones, are
oppressed by a debt so huge that repayment is practically impossible. . . .
The abuses of power which result in some dominating others must
stop: such abuses are sinful and unjust.146
In this formulation, too much debt is not simply inefficient; it is an immoral
abuse of power and denial of human dignity. The Jubilee movement drew on
ideas of dignity and fresh start that also underpin personal bankruptcy to
support demands for debt reduction for sovereign states.147 The movement has
secured dramatic debt relief for some of the world’s poorest countries from
bilateral and multilateral creditors; it continues to press for more.148
Another rationale for sovereign debt relief steps even further away from the
traditional efficiency reasoning, as it does not depend on the amount of debt at
issue. The theory of “Odious Debt,” found variously in judicial decisions,149
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Leviticus 25:8-14 (decreeing every fiftieth year a “jubilee year,” and mandating among other
things the liberation of slaves); see The Holy See—Jubilee 2000, HOLY SEE,
http://www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000 (last visited July 11, 2011); Mac Krzyzewski, 15 Years
Later: The Jubilee Movement, BLOG DEBT (Apr. 20, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://jubileeusa
.typepad.com/blog_the_debt/2011/04/15-years-later-the-jubilee-movement.html.
Pope John Paul II, Incarnationis Mysterium: Bull of Indiction of the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000,
§ 12 (1998), http://www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000/docs/documents/hf_jp-ii_doc_30111998
_bolla-jubilee_en.html.
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 136, at 1393.
Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm
(noting the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative); JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN, supra note 142.
Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 R.I.A.A. 375 (1923) (distinguishing state succession from
presumption of continuity in government obligations).
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treaty history,150 and the writings of some early twentieth-century scholars,151
holds that debt incurred by a state without the authority and not in the
interests of its people is unenforceable. Policy and academic interest in the
theory revived in the mid-2000s, when Iraq sought to renegotiate over $100
billion in debt incurred by Saddam Hussein.152 Although Iraq ultimately
declined to use the theory, Ecuador used a version in 2009 to secure dramatic
concessions from creditors threatened with nonpayment on illegitimacy
grounds.153 Because debt relief came at a time when Ecuador was enjoying
surplus oil revenues and did not claim unsustainability, some criticized the
operation as an instance of pure unwillingness to pay.154 Because it does not
rest on economic necessity, the Odious Debt doctrine would give legal sanction
to unwillingness to pay.
Although Odious Debt theory is grounded in state succession and at first
blush seems unique to full sovereigns, scholars have found ready parallels in
private law.155 Private debt that has been fraudulently incurred, or whose
proceeds were misappropriated with the knowledge of the creditors (much as a
dictator might misappropriate the proceeds of a public debt issue into her
offshore bank account), may not be enforceable under contract, agency, and
corporate law doctrines. The outcomes closely track the goals of Odious Debt.
***
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ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 337-42 (1931) (describing
debt negotiations following the Spanish-American War).
A.N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET
AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES 157-58 (1927), quoted in PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS:
LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165-66
(1991).
Scholarship advocating and responding to the revival of Odious Debt doctrines after the fall
of Saddam Hussein includes Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 82, 83 (2006), which presents a leading economic account of the Odious Debt
doctrine, and proposes financial sanctions as a policy response; Symposium, Odious Debts
and State Corruption, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer & Autumn 2007.
REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, NOTEHOLDER CIRCULAR, at iii-iv (Apr. 20, 2009), available at
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/files/2009/04/noteholder-circular-goe-bond-offer.pdf
(Letter from the Minister of Finance); id. at 18 (Considerations Relating to the Republic).
See, e.g., Arturo C. Porzecanski, When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts:
The Case of Ecuador, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 258 (2010).
Buchheit et al., supra note 137 (proposing to sanction sovereign debt nonpayment where
debt proceeds were misappropriated, on the model of contract, agency, and corporate law
applicable to private firms).
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Scholars, advocates, and policymakers have articulated three distinct
arguments for sovereign debt relief, grounded in efficiency, autonomy, and
legitimacy—which map onto theories about debt overhang, fresh start/Jubilee,
and Odious Debt. These grounds for relief can easily apply to all public debtors
without regard to sovereignty. They have counterparts in private debt.
Although efficiency, autonomy, and legitimacy concerns motivate
bankruptcy and debtor-creditor laws, it bears emphasis that none of them
requires bankruptcy. Debt overhang, Jubilee, and Odious Debt are all reasons
for debt forgiveness. Each may benefit from process legitimacy and
coordination techniques found in certain bankruptcy institutions, but that
benefit cannot be assumed. Below I turn to consider the process for quasisovereign debt restructuring and any gaps that might benefit from
bankruptcy’s help.
C. Quasi-Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Despite repeated fiscal crises and a rich history of debt defaults throughout
the nineteenth century, U.S. states offer few modern-day examples of debt
default and restructuring. Arkansas suffered a relatively brief episode of default
in 1933, when it tried and failed to replace revenue-backed bonds with faith and
credit debt over creditors’ objections.156 Since then, state budget problems have
met with a mix of state budget and service cutbacks, federalization of services,
and fiscal transfers.157 Some scholars have argued that the dearth of modernday state defaults in the United States reflects a learning process going back to
nineteenth-century defaults, when the federal government refused to bail out
states and municipalities. In this view, states became more prudent borrowers,
and their creditors became better risk monitors. In the aftermath of defaults,
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See, e.g., Joe Mysak, Bond Default Is About Too Much Debt, Too Little Time, BLOOMBERG, July
20, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-21/bond-default-means-too-much
-debt-too-little-time-commentary-by-joe-mysak.html.
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1241 (2009)
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states enacted dubious borrowing limitations, but in an effort to circumvent
them, tightened the links between debt repayment and revenues.158 Outside the
United States, subnational debt issuance (sovereign or not) is a relatively
recent and limited phenomenon.159 While some countries have begun to
experiment with subnational insolvency frameworks,160 other cases of
subnational debt distress have been resolved ad hoc, with a mix of defaults,
restructurings, and federal bailouts without recourse to statutory or other
standing institutional mechanisms.161 The lingering crisis in Europe continues
to be fertile ground for experimentation. At this writing, members continue to
resist large-scale fiscal transfers outside crisis.162 However, they have committed
to temporary and permanent crisis resolution facilities, empowered to lend to
distressed member states on strict policy conditions. At the same time, the
European Central Bank has been buying member state bonds on the secondary
market using its monetary policy authority to counter market disruptions. It

Rodden, supra note 77 (manuscript at 9-10) (arguing that U.S. states benefit from market
discipline following nineteenth-century defaults in the absence of federal bailouts); Isabel
Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Crises, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE: UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES (David A. Skeel, Jr. & Peter Conti-Brown eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 30)
(on file with author) (suggesting that U.S. federal, state, and local governments have
adapted in the aftermath of nineteenth-century defaults, to enact constitutions and laws that
more closely align borrowing and revenue sources).
159. Liu & Waibel, supra note 3, at 2; see also WORLD BANK ET AL., CREDIT RATINGS AND BOND
ISSUING AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL (1999) (an early-stage training manual for developing
countries); Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 158 (manuscript at 3) (noting the
enormous size of the U.S. state debt market compared to the rest of the world).
160. Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 158 (manuscript at 4).
161. Argentina offers a high-profile recent example of sub-sovereign debt default and
restructuring. Argentina’s provinces have borrowed heavily on the international capital
markets and in foreign currency. Provincial borrowing stood at 4-6% of GDP in the run-up
to the financial crisis of 2001, but rose to 10% of GDP in 2002-04. The central government
effectively assumed much of the provincial debt in 2004. In addition, some provinces
unilaterally defaulted or restructured their bonds, yet others conducted distressed debt
exchanges in the international capital markets. INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, supra note 43, at
278-279, available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1581016;
see also Rodrigo Trelles Zabala, Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, in SUBNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 28, at 231, 238, 258; Moody’s, Why
Some Sub-sovereign Ratings in Argentina are Higher than the Sovereign (Mar. 2010); Standard
& Poor’s, A Paradox: Provincial Versus Sovereign Debt Restructuring in Argentina (Mar. 2004).
162. Government Analysis: Euro Bonds Would Cost Germany Billions, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Aug.
22, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,781524,00.html.
158.
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has maintained that such operations do not constitute financing for member
governments, which is prohibited under its charter and European law.163
A cross-country analysis of subnational restructuring experience is an
empirical project beyond the scope of this Feature.164 Instead, this Section
draws on the “map” of quasi-sovereign attributes in Part I to consider the likely
challenges for managing quasi-sovereign debt distress. These challenges fall
under three general themes: debt reduction, economic rehabilitation, and
political legitimacy, which I elaborate below. Approaches to debt distress also
impact ex ante debt management.
1. Debt Reduction
Quasi-sovereigns have advantages over private debtors and some
sovereigns: they are substantially sheltered from litigation and attachment and
have a powerful counter to creditor collective action problems in the form of
sovereign immunity. As a result, they might be expected to face fewer obstacles
on the path to debt relief compared to other debtors, even without bankruptcy.
However, reputational, economic-policy, and political constraints may prevent
them from pursuing debt reduction at all, in time, or in the optimal amount.
To the extent that fiscal federalism creates incentives to externalize debt
problems and seek bailouts, it weakens the impetus to seek debt relief. The
central challenge of quasi-sovereign debt adjustment then is to help the debtor
overcome reputational, economic, and political—not judicial, contractual, or
coordination—barriers to restructuring.
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Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 Establishing a Securities Market
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2. Rehabilitation
With respect to rehabilitation, quasi-sovereigns face formidable problems.
They may have limited legal, economic, and political capacity to raise revenues
from taxation. Statutory and constitutional fiscal limits, however narrow and
“disfavored,” may still bind at the margin.165 Raising taxes to pay creditors may
be economically inefficient and politically toxic, antagonizing residents and
chasing away investors.166
On the other hand, immune states have limited capacity to commit to
better economic policies, to respect contractual repayment priorities, or even to
repay debts going forward. No external power can tell a quasi-sovereign what
to do—external commitment is most credible when grounded in dependence
on the outside world. This is the crux of conditionality as a vehicle for policy
reform, and, on the flipside, the reason why surplus economies can feel
insulated from outside policy demands.
Returning a state to viability above all requires internal political support for
the mix of public goods provided by the government and revenues it collects
going forward, and agreement on loss distribution among taxpayers, service
recipients, contractual creditors, and other constituents, including other
members of the federal union.
3. Political Legitimacy
Political support for quasi-sovereign debt relief and restructuring must go
far beyond aligning creditor incentives. All manner of constituents receiving
services and paying taxes have to be involved to sustain a restructuring. This
bargain must be further coordinated within the federal system, perhaps
adjusting the allocation of responsibilities between the quasi-sovereign state
and the central government to ensure uninterrupted provision of essential
public services. Narrow analogies of taxes to corporate revenues, or of citizens
to customers and equity holders, in an effort to replicate “creditors’ bargain”

165.
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See sources cited supra note 111 and accompanying text.
Krugman, supra note 138 (grounding sovereign debt overhang theory in the expectation of
tax increases for the benefit of creditors). Compare Kordana, supra note 73 (suggesting that
bankruptcy courts have an implied capacity to force tax increases in municipal bankruptcy,
and arguing against tax increases), with Gillette, supra note 22 (arguing that courts should be
granted an express power to compel tax increases).
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arguments from corporate bankruptcy quickly fail167: they miss the core motives,
and elevate the marginal attributes, of the protagonists in public debt distress.
Even where all the relevant constituents might agree on a rehabilitation
plan, there are no obvious candidates to design it and oversee compliance.
Vesting federal courts with design and oversight functions can raise objections
on federalism and institutional competence grounds. Such courts may be
uniquely ill-equipped to second-guess a constituent sovereign’s decisions about
distribution of taxes and services. They are not accountable to the people
affected and have no fiscal management expertise. Liquidation value and
classified voting, which serve as substantive and procedural benchmarks to aid
judges in private bankruptcy, are hard to replicate in public debt. The federal
executive or an outside creditor, such as an international financial institution,
are problematic alternatives. Although such institutions might have more
expertise than the courts, their local legitimacy is limited and, with it,
the compliance pull. Their conditional funding model might give rise to a
presumption of sovereign consent and optimism about compliance: a
democratic government voluntarily and specifically agrees to rehabilitation
policies in exchange for rescue funds. However, where the debtor is in
desperate straits, consent to reforms might be illusory or fragile.
4. Debt Management Incentives
An effective debt restructuring regime should counteract the quasisovereign debtor’s propensity to overborrow and engage in pro-cyclical fiscal
policies in the expectation of federal bailouts, and to compensate for its limited
capacity to commit with fragile debt structures. To the extent possible, such a
regime should also strive to reduce the time-consistency problems arising both
from the state’s immortality (such as intergenerational transfers) and the short
political horizons of public officials. By implication, a sound restructuring
regime would impart better incentives for creditors to monitor quasi-sovereign
debt accumulation.
My task in Part III is to consider the extent to which bankruptcy tools
might help address these challenges.
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iii. mapping to bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is a historically and culturally contingent set of institutions:
bankruptcy in Adam Smith’s Scotland shares little with its namesake in today’s
United States, which in turn only vaguely resembles contemporary bankruptcy
in Sweden, Korea, or Brazil. Over time, bankruptcy regimes have negotiated
the tension between helping creditors collect and helping debtors get relief and
have reduced the spillover effects and deadweight losses of prolonged debt
distress.
In the United States, even the essential goals of bankruptcy remain
vigorously contested by scholars, despite the fact that its broad remit has been
defined by judges. David Skeel observes that after two centuries of U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, “bankruptcy has come to include nearly any
reasonably comprehensive framework for adjusting a debtor’s obligations,
providing for payment of creditors, and giving the debtor a discharge.”168
In the eyes of its supporters and practitioners, bankruptcy gets credit for
promoting triage between viable economic actors that should be rehabilitated,
and those that are not viable and must be liquidated. Bankruptcy can advance
the rule of law by creating a safety valve for modifying unsustainable contracts
in an orderly, legitimate process. It can help promote the autonomy and
dignity of individual debtors through debt discharge. Theorists have variously
imbued bankruptcy with economic efficiency, human dignity, and community
values. It is truly a capacious idea.
Bankruptcy has sought to achieve its goals with a distinct set of methods.169
An automatic stay on debt enforcement can help overcome creditor collective
action problems and promote a comprehensive, collective adjustment
process.170 Bankruptcy can offer a framework for collective decisionmaking
among the affected stakeholders based on their contractual and statutory
endowments, notably including a relatively uniform system of repayment
priorities.171 It can support rehabilitation by allowing debtors to assume or
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Skeel, State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, supra note 8 (manuscript at 5).
For a cross-country survey of bankruptcy methods, see LEGAL DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY
FUND, ORDERLY AND EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES: KEY ISSUES (1999), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
See, e.g., id. §§ 726, 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). In the United States, uniformity is achieved
nationwide by federal statute, under constitutional authority. However, to the extent
bankruptcy law respects contractual priorities, it allows for considerable variation within the
uniform system.
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reject prebankruptcy contracts,172 and by providing a source of priority interim
financing during reorganization.173 In corporate distress, bankruptcy gets credit
for advancing fairness and economic efficiency by ensuring that creditors get
no less in a reorganization than they would in liquidation.174 At its most
general, bankruptcy supports orderly debt restructuring and reduces its
reputational stigma by extending legal sanction and judicial oversight to the
process of discarding otherwise valid contracts. In theory, all these elements
together create a background legal regime that supports both out-of-court
reorganization ex post and debt management practices ex ante that are
consistent with the values of the regime.
What might such a regime hold for quasi-sovereign debtors? David Skeel
articulates “core principles” anchoring his state bankruptcy proposal. These are
comparable treatment among similarly situated creditors, including a uniform
and “coherent” scheme of payment priorities; freedom to modify contracts,
including those now protected by state law; capacity of creditor majorities to
bind dissenters; and debt discharge to promote a fresh start.175 In addition,
bankruptcy along the lines Skeel describes could help states tap private
financial markets during reorganization, reducing the need for public bailouts,
and might reduce the stigma of seeking debt relief.
These bankruptcy tools are important. However, more is needed to
establish bankruptcy as the preferred solution to quasi-sovereign debt
problems. First, a legislature might consider whether these tools would address
the core problems with quasi-sovereign debt restructuring; second, whether
they would be effective at solving such problems; and third, whether they leave
important problems to be solved outside bankruptcy.
Sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns in distress come under pressure to cherrypick among their constituents, and to alter the prebankruptcy bargain. Their
response to such pressure varies with political and economic factors: some may
prefer unions or critical service providers, others local banks, yet others foreign
bondholders. As Skeel suggests, the practice appears to be unsystematic,176 as is
the range of express contractual and constitutional priorities chosen and
announced by the states.
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It is hard to argue with the value of greater predictability and equality in
the treatment of similarly situated creditors. Nevertheless, it represents a
tradeoff for flexibility in responding to the enormously complex economic and
political problems of a few dozen debtors, all too big to fail.177 “Similarly
situated” is hard to define in advance for creditors that wear multiple hats with
respect to the state, simultaneously playing banker, customer, and employee.
At a minimum, the diversity of claims, especially noncontractual claims,
against a distressed sovereign, would make it harder to structure equal
treatment rules. Suppose a state running short of cash faced the choice between
paying its retail bondholders, depositors in failed banks, employees, suppliers,
pensioners, and hungry children. How might these groups be “classified” for
purposes of repayment priority and a bankruptcy reorganization vote? What is
the justification for redistributing resources to one or two of the groups at the
expense of the others? For private debtors in bankruptcy, these decisions are
made primarily by contract and to a lesser extent in background legislation. For
sovereigns without bankruptcy, they are often made ad hoc, except in the few
cases where constitutional, statutory, or contractual priorities limit sovereign
discretion. Of course it is technically possible to devise a classification scheme,
and even to put it to a vote. Such a vote would address fundamental questions
of distribution and democratic governance; it would be odd to describe it as a
bankruptcy matter.
The value of greater uniformity, or coherence, is even less certain.
Uniformity is a political choice. For example, unlike many other federal
arrangements around the world, U.S. fiscal federalism represents a conscious
choice in favor of diversity in economic management,178 reflected in a small
way in some states’ apparently scattered decisions to favor education, clean
water, or bondholders in their repayment priorities. Although states would
presumably have the capacity to opt out of the federal priority system, the
content of such a system would be hard to determine, and its utility may be
limited, depending on the number of states that choose to opt out.
The ability to assume and reject unperformed contracts can be a valuable
tool for debt reduction, but one that raises questions of political legitimacy.
With public debtors, unlike private ones, bankruptcy would not just trump
private agreements but, more importantly, prior public laws. Where statutory
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Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Tarullo, supra note 3.
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and constitutional protections for contracts come out of a legitimate political
process, they may reflect all manner of values unrelated to debt management or
even the daily business of running the government. Put differently, they are
not only, and not even primarily, liabilities. It is far from clear that a debate
about bankruptcy law is the right forum for arguing about eliminating,
changing, or funding such protections.
The need for bankruptcy to bind dissenting creditors (“cramdown”), and
even to effect debt discharge, depends on the strength of sovereign immunities.
If immunities are robust, creditor collective action problems of all sorts are
diffused, because the debtor can simply refuse to pay, extracting concessions
from cooperative creditors and ignoring the dissenters. Similarly, discharge is
essential where enforcement is a real threat, less so where it is not. The
impressive record of sovereign debt restructuring in the 1990s and 2000s, the
slim evidence of serious collective action problems among creditors of
sovereign or quasi-sovereign debtors, and the fact that some quasi-sovereigns
(notably U.S. states) have stronger immunities than full sovereigns all suggest
that cramdown and discharge might be less valuable for quasi-sovereigns than
they have been for private debtors.
This is not to say that cramdown is worthless for states. Sovereign debtors
that have successfully evaded their creditors would no doubt prefer to have no
holdouts than to have holdouts barred from collecting by a web of immunities.
Defending against creditor lawsuits is expensive, even if you win. Using
contractual tools to bind nonconsenting creditors in lieu of bankruptcy can
have reputational costs.179 Even so, cramdown has a very different value for
immune debtors than for traditional bankruptcy subjects.
Enforcing priority for new financing would face all the challenges of
extracting credible commitment from immune sovereigns. On the one hand,
senior private debt financing should reduce bailout demands. On the other
hand, where bailouts are conditioned on policy reform, it also limits scant
policy leverage. Such priority, which would operate in a state fiscal crisis, may
even be perceived as entitled to an implicit federal guarantee, diminishing the
anti-bailout effect. Nevertheless, the overall effect may be to reduce federal
exposure and introduce a measure of market monitoring—a real benefit.
Finally, the extent to which bankruptcy tools would be effective against
reputational barriers to debt restructuring is uncertain. Legal sanction alone is
valuable in promoting relief, and a standing bankruptcy regime would certainly
provide it. However, reputational factors are also important for sovereign and
nonsovereign debtors alike. For quasi-sovereigns, the role of reputation as a
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barrier to filing would depend on market and political factors, as well as the
terms of the federal arrangement.
In sum, bankruptcy could solve real problems; however, many if not most
of these are collateral, and sometimes debatable, impediments to quasisovereign debt relief. And for all the virtues of such bankruptcy tools, the list of
tools that bankruptcy does not bring to the quasi-sovereign restructuring table
is impressive.
Bankruptcy would not overcome the quasi-sovereign commitment
challenge, which is rooted in sovereign immunity. It adds little to the quasisovereign debtor’s protections from lawsuits and asset seizures. For private
debtors, the bankruptcy shield promotes reorganization. Perversely, if
bankruptcy were to fortify states’ protection from creditors, it might weaken
the incentives for economic adjustment and reform (higher taxes, lower
spending, structural change). This effect is in contrast to private debtors,
whose stakeholders are presumptively motivated to raise revenues.
Bankruptcy would not perform a triage function by putting poorly
managed sovereigns out of commission, while rehabilitating the efficient ones.
It has no advantage in creating a constituency for taxes or economic policy
reform, although it can help reduce expenditures by making it easier for the
debtor to reject problematic contracts. It would not get rid of elected public and
politically appointed officials, however inept.
Bankruptcy would not improve quasi-sovereign decisionmaking in distress.
A structured, comprehensive, collective process for involving all the necessary
constituents in a state debt restructuring must replicate the existing political
process at multiple levels of government. This follows from the fact that a
quasi-sovereign’s set of constituents is not identical to, or even substantially
overlapping with, its set of contractual counterparties.
Removing high-pitched political controversy to a more technocratic and
bureaucratic venue has its virtues. The ascent of technocratic national unity
governments in Greece and Italy illustrates the widespread appeal of technical
solutions in political crises. However, if a public debt bankruptcy process is to
be truly comprehensive, insulation from political scrutiny is both unrealistic
and undesirable. A partial debt adjustment process with respect to a discreet
category of debts might be more susceptible to technocratic management.
Overhauling core economic structures of the state with a view to rehabilitation
is for the political process.
Unless bankruptcy’s reputational effect is truly powerful in promoting debt
reduction, it would do little to affect quasi-sovereign incentives to demand
bailouts and federal incentives to dispense them. As a result, bankruptcy’s
effect on states’ poor ex ante debt management incentives is questionable at
best.
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It is helpful to consider the benefits of bankruptcy next to a more prosaic
alternative, such as federal transfers conditional on policy reform and debt
restructuring—“bailouts with strings.” This tool is commonly used in federal
systems, and internationally by institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, to address crises180 and promote structural
reform.181 Its record is often criticized.182 Nevertheless, conditional financing
addresses the challenge of comprehensive rehabilitation of quasi-sovereign
debtors more directly and transparently than bankruptcy might. Bailouts with
strings can leverage existing incentives to provide fiscal transfers in crisis, to
achieve substantial policy changes, and perhaps even to help push quasisovereign debtors over the tipping point to seek debt restructuring.
Conditional financing faces all the usual sovereign commitment and
program design problems. It is often criticized for lack of political legitimacy
(“ownership”) where the recipient has no choice but to agree to reform in
exchange for a financial lifeline. Yet the political legitimacy of conditional
federal transfers is more intuitive than that of foreign financing. And even
critics acknowledge the occasional capacity of well-designed budget support
programs to achieve economic reform in difficult political environments.183
conclusion
Quasi-sovereign debtors are a diverse bunch: the scope of their immunities,
policy autonomy, and transfer entitlements come from negotiated political
compromise, embodied in treaties and constitutional arrangements. Even so,
quasi-sovereigns as a group share traits that set them apart from all other
debtors. Unlike firms and people, they have public functions and political
constituents. Unlike fully sovereign states, they face perverse incentives from
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fiscal transfers, which can embed and hide bailouts, and let quasi-sovereigns
shift the cost of low taxes and high benefits onto the federation. Like sovereign
states and unlike nonsovereign localities, they can benefit from immunities that
shield them from creditor enforcement and diffuse creditor coordination
problems. Such protections create commitment and related moral hazard
problems. These and other features can easily make for dysfunctional debt
management. This apparent dysfunction seems tailor-made for bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy is a beguiling idea. For private debtors, it variously promises
order, efficiency, fairness, dignity, and political legitimacy. State bankruptcy
proposals have an impressive pedigree, going back to Adam Smith. Quasisovereign debtors face real overindebtedness and incentive problems, as well as
formidable legal, economic, and political obstacles to sustainable restructuring
and reform.
Nevertheless, bankruptcy’s potential contribution to solving quasisovereign debt problems is limited. It has no capacity to effect economic policy
reform or revenue collection, or to structure broad-based political
decisionmaking about economic policy. Where the debtor has robust
immunities, bankruptcy does not overcome sovereign commitment problems
and adds little to a state’s bargaining power against its financial creditors. It
may help overcome reputational barriers for quasi-sovereign states seeking debt
relief, and it may make debt restructuring by the few eligible debtors more
predictable at the margins.
On the cost side of the ledger, a bankruptcy regime would contribute to a
narrowing of political space. It can create the illusion of a comprehensive fix,
even as it detracts from important debates about distribution and the role and
cost of government. This was perhaps the biggest flaw in the International
Monetary Fund’s proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism a
decade ago: it was a narrow solution to a narrow set of theoretical collective
action problems among the foreign bondholders of a small group of countries.
It excluded the vast majority of sovereign debt, such as debt to domestic
creditors and debt governed by domestic law. To call such a limited device
bankruptcy (still a popular shorthand for the proposal) is to vastly oversell its
aspirations while drawing attention away from more fundamental problems of
economic management and distribution among the state’s many varied
constituents.184 When borrowed, bankruptcy vocabulary is also prone to
manipulation: a bailout of a state in a transfer union is neither descriptively nor
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normatively comparable to a bailout of a private bank or manufacturing firm.
To be sure, minimal ex ante commitments to a debt restructuring process can
be useful;185 but they should not be confused with cardinal solutions or draw
vast resources and political capital for enactment and implementation.
Against the background of a gridlocked political system, debating a process
called “bankruptcy,” or one structured to advance a set of bankruptcy values
blessed with historical pedigree and even constitutional sanction, may give the
system a jolt to consider measures that were previously beyond the policy pale.
Bankruptcy proposals have already helped start an important conversation
about a category of public debt that remains understudied: the debt of quasisovereign states. The benefit of proceeding with bankruptcy design, with or
without the bankruptcy name, must now be weighed against the cost of further
stretching the concept of bankruptcy, and, more importantly, of framing
political decisions about autonomy, federalism and economic policy in the
narrow terms of debt collection and debt relief.
This Feature has argued against this tradeoff. It is not an argument against
bankruptcy values or bankruptcy tools. These can be helpful, especially where
coordination problems abound either because immunity is limited, or for other
reasons. From this perspective, if Europe were to agree on a debt restructuring
and state rehabilitation process, including a regime for fiscal transfers, it might
help overcome coordination problems among member states—spillover victims
and contingent bailout providers. Bankruptcy could provide some of the
vocabulary for negotiating fiscal federalism; however, it neither determines nor
displaces the outcome—the result is federalism, not bankruptcy. On the other
hand, U.S. states appear to face fewer coordination problems, and to have
more tools to secure debt adjustment.
States might benefit from the ability to cram down rehabilitation plans
against the will of dissenting creditors, but any such benefit must be weighed
against the cost of exacerbating sovereign commitment problems. Bankruptcy
techniques might help yet. To make them relevant, the conversation should
now refocus on the hard but unavoidable questions about quasi-sovereign
debt, with its seemingly intractable problems of commitment, incentives, and
legitimacy.
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